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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
Fiduciary Obligations and 
Aboriginal Peoples 
The relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, who include 
the Indian, Inuit, and Metis peoplcs,1 is unique in Canadian law. As the original inhabit-
ants of Canada, it has long been recognized that the Aboriginal peoples have their own 
status and special rights.2 These rights arise in part from the occupation and use of lands 
by the Indians and Inuit as organized societies before French and British colonization. 
Rights stemming from this source are known as Aboriginal rights. In many parts of the 
country, these rights have been partially replaced by treaty rights. Special protection has · 
also been accorded to Aboriginal rights by a variety of constitutional documents, includ-
ing the Royal Proclamation of 1763,3 the Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory 
Order of 1870,4 the Manitoba Act, 1870,s and the Constitution Act, 1930.6 More recently, 
the Constitution Act, 1982 has provided general constitutional protection for these rights 
in the following section: 
35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affirmed.7 
Since at least 1763, the Crown has taken responsibility for the protection of Aboriginal 
peoples and their rights, especially vis-a-vis European settlers.8 The preamble to the 
Aboriginal provisions in the Royal Proclamation. of 1763 stated: 
The Constitution Act, 1982 (Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. l l (UK)), s. 35(2) provides: "In this 
Act, 'aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and Meris peoples of Canada." 
2 See Kenneth Lysyk, "The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian" (1967), 45 Canadian 
Bar Review 513-53. 
3 RSC 1985, app. TT, no. 1. 
4 Ibid., no. 9. 
5 32 & 33 Viel. , c. 3 (Can.). 
6 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 (UK). 
7 Supra note 1. See R v. Sparrow, (1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
8 See Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, r 1990) 2 SCR 85, per La Forest J, at 129-31. For discussion, see 
"Fiduciary Obligalions and Federal Responsibility for the Aboriginal Peoples," in Kent McNeil, Emerging 
Justice? Essays on 111dige11ous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 2001) (Emerging Justice?), at 309-55. 
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And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of our 
Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and 
who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such 
Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having being ceded to or purchased by Us, 
are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.9 
The Proclamation went on to reserve those unceded lands for the Indians, and to prohibit 
colonial governors from surveying or granting them and British subjects from settling on 
or purchasing them. To prevent the "great Frauds and Abuses [that] have been committed 
in purchasing Lands of the Indians," the Crown placed itself between the Indians and the 
settlers by providing that "if at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to 
dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some 
public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose."10 Only after 
Indian lands had been purchased by the Crown would they be available for grant to settlers. 
The Royal Proclan?ation of 1763 was issued directly from London by King George III. 
The British Crown thus accepted responsibility for Aboriginal affairs, and retained control 
over relations with the Indian nations with whom the Crown was "connected" and who 
lived under the Crown's "protection" (in the words of the Proclamation). In 1860, author-
ity over Aboriginal affairs was transferred to the province of Canada.11 When the Domin-
ion of Canada was created in 1867, jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the 
Indians" was given to the Canadian Parliament by s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867.12 This provision has been interpreted to include jurisdiction over the Inuit,13 but 
whether it also extends to the Metis is still an unresolved question.14 The British govern-
ment nonetheless retained the power to intervene through the reservation and disallow-
ance powers, 15 and of course the British Parliament kept overriding legislative powers in 
relation to non-constitutional matters until enactment of the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 16 
and over constitutional matters until enactment of the Canada Act, 1982. 11 
Evidence that the British government did not intend to divest itself completely of 
responsibility for Aboriginal affairs in 1867 can be found in the order in council of June 
9 Supra note 3, at 4-5. 
l 0 Ibid., at 6. 
11 See John S. Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change," in Ian 
A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, eds., As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader ilt 
Canaditm Native Studies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983), at 56-64. 
12 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (UK). 
13 Sec Reference re Term "Indians," f 1939) SCR 104. 
14 For a convincing argumenl lhal the Melis arc included, see Clem Chartier, " 'Indian': An Analysis of the 
Term as Used in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867" (1978-79), 43 Saskatchewa11.U1w 
Review 37-69. See also R v. Grwnbo, Ll998] 3 CNLR 172 (Sask. CA). Compare R v. Blais, [2003) 2 SCR 236. 
15 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 12, ss. 55-57. 
16 22 Geo. V, c. 4 (UK). 
17 Supra note 1. See Brian Slauery, "The Independence of Canada" (l 983), 5 Supreme Court law Review 
369-404. 
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23, 1870, which transferred Rupert's Land and the No11h-Western Territory to Canada on 
condition that, among other things, 
Any claims of Indians to compensation for lands required for purposes of settlement shall 
be disposed of by the Canadian Government in communication with the Imperial Govern-
ment. [Emphasis added.]18 
However, in actual practice, it appears that this power to intervene was not exercised, and 
no doubt lapsed by 1931 with the enactment of the Statute of Westminster 193J .19 
Some of the constitutional documents we have been discussing contain language that 
suggests that the Crown (origina11y British, subsequently Canadian) stands in a trust-like 
position in relation to the Aboriginal peoples. The Royal Proclamation of 1763, for 
example, reserved lands "under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion.for the use of 
the said Indians" (emphasis added).20 In an 1869 Joint Address, the Senate and House of 
Commons of Canada requested the transfer of Rupert's Land and the North-Western 
Territory to Canada on the undertaking that "it will be our duty to make adequate 
provision for the protection of the Indian tribes whose interests and well-being are 
involved in the transfer,"21 and that commitment formed part of the basis for the actual 
transfer in 1870.22 However, until the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin 
v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335 (reproduced, in parl, in section II.A, below), it was not 
clear whether commitments like these created a fiduciary relationship that could result in 
Crown liability in appropriate circumstances or merely gave rise to moral or political 
obligations that were unenforceable in the courts.23 
I . POLITICAL TRUSTS 
The concept of an unenforceable "political trust" can be found in the common law. In 
Civilian War Claimants v. The King, [1932] AC 14, the House of Lords held that money 
paid to the British government by Germany pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles at the end 
of World War I was not subject to an enforceable trust or agency in favour of the British 
civilians who had suffered the damage that that money was intended to compensate. Lord 
18 Rupert's Land and North-Western Territo1y Order of 1870, supra note 4, Term 14. 
19 Sec R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Indian Association of 
Alberta, [1982) QB 892 (CA); Kent McNeil, Native Claims in Rupert's Land and the North-Western 
Territory: Canada 's Co11stitutional Obligations (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law 
Centre, 1982), at 34-35. 
20 Supra note 3; at 5. 
21 Rupert's Land and North-Western Te1Titory Order of 1870, supra note 4, schedule B, at 16. 
22 See McNeil, supra note 19, at 13-26. For a discussion of whether the Rupert's Land and North-Western 
Territo1y Orde1• of 1870 imposed fiduciary obligations on the federal government, sec Renee Dupuis and 
Kent McNeil, Canada's Fiducia1y Obligation to Aboriginal Peoples in the Context of Accession to 
Sovereignty by Quebec (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1995), at 25-29. 
23 See Leonard Ian Rotman, Para/lei Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-Native Relationship in 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), esp. at 73-87. 
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Atkin said, at 27, that "[t]here is nothjng, so far as I know, to prevent the Crown acting as 
agent or trustee if it chooses deliberately to do so." However, their Lordships found that 
there was no indication that the Crown had intended to accept either of those roles. 
Relying on Rustomjee v. The Queen (1876), 2 QBD 69 (CA), they decided that the 
Crown's duty to distribute the money to the civilian claimants was a duty to dispense 
justice that could not be enforced in the courts. Whatever responsibility the Crown had 
was a responsibility of its advisers that was owed solely to Parliament. 
The political trust doctrine was applied more recently in Tito v. Waddell (No. 2), which 
involved a claim by indigenous people for breach of fiduciary obligations by the Crown. 
Tito v. Waddell (No. 2) 
[1977] 3 All ER 129 (Ch.) 
[This case involved a claim by the Banabans, the indigenous people of Ocean Island 
in the Pacific, against the British Crown for damages relating to the destruction of 
their homeland through phosphate mining. Among other things, the Banabans al-
leged that the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to them, arising from a trust, and that the 
Crown had breached this duty. In the course of a lengthy judgment dealing with com-
plex factual and legal issues that do not need to be described here, MEGARRY V-C 
commented generally (at 216-17) on the potential for the Crown to be a trustee.] 
I propose to turn at once to the position of the Crown as tmstee, leaving on one side 
any question of what is meant by the Crown for this purpose; and I must also consider 
what is meant by "trust." The word is in common use in the English language, and 
whatever may be the position in this court, it must be recognised that the word is 
often used in a sense different from that of an equitable obligation enforceable as 
such by the courts. Many a man may be in a position of trust without being a trustee 
in the equitable sense; and terms such as "brains tnist," "anti-trust," and "trust territo-
ries," though commonly used, are not understood as relating to a tlust as enforced in a 
court of equity. At the same time, it can hardly be disputed that a trust may be created 
without using the word "trust." In every case one has to look to see whether in the 
circumstances of the case, and on the true construction of what was said and written, 
a sufficient intention to create a true trust has been manifested. 
When it is alleged that the Crown is a trustee, an element which is of special im-
portance consists of the governmental powers and obligations of the Crown; for these . 
readily provid~ an explanation which is an alternative to a tnist. If money or other 
prope1ty is vested in the Crown and is used for the benefit of others, one explanation 
can be that the Crown holds on a true tnist for those others. Another explanation can 
be that, without holding the property on a tnie trust, the Crown is nevertheless admin-
istering that prope1ty in the exercise of the Crown's governmental functions. This 
latter possible explanation, which does not exist in the case of an ordinary individual, 
makes it necessary to scrutinise with greater care the words and circumstances which . · 
are alleged to impose a trust. · 
·;~ 
,:'. 
•':,..-,: 
;.~ 
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[Megarry V-C went on to discuss the Rustomjee and Civilian War Claimants cases, 
above, as well as Kinloch v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1882), 7 App. 
Cas. 619, another House of Lords' decision applying the.political trust doctrine. Re-
ferring to Kin.loch, he said, at 220-21 : 1 · 
That case, of course, concerned facts which were very different from the facts of 
the case before me. Yet it supports certain principles or considerations which are of 
relevance and importance. First, the use of a phrase such as "in trnst for," even in a 
formal document such as a Royal Wan·ant, does not necessarily create a trust enforce-
able by the courts. As Lord O'Hagan said [in Kinloch, at 630]: "There is no magic in 
the word 'trnst.'" Second, the term "trust" is one which may properly be used to 
describe not only relationships which are enforceable by the courts in their equitable 
jurisdiction, but also other relationships such as the discharge, under the direction of 
the Crown, of the duties or functions belonging to the prerogative and the authority of 
the Crown. Trusts of the former kind, so familiar in this Division, are described by 
Lord Selbornc LC as being "trusts in the lower sense"; trusts of the latter kind, so 
unfamiliar in this Division, he called "trusts in the higher sense." 
I pause at that point. This classification of trusts seems to have made little impact 
on the books: see, e g, Lewin on Trusts [l6th ed. (1964), at 10 and 13], Underhill on 
Trusts and Trustees [12th ed. (1970), at 51] and Halsbury's Laws of England [38 
Halsbury's Laws (3d ed.), at 810]. There is, indeed, a certain awkwardness in de-
scribing as a trnst a relationship which is not enforceable by the courts, though the 
so-called trusts of imperfect obligation perhaps provide some sort of parallel. Cer-
tainly in common speech in legal circles "trust" is normally used to mean an equita-
ble relationship enforceable in the courts and not a governmental relationship which 
is not thus enforceable. I propose to use the word "trust" simpliciter (or for emphasis 
the phrase "true trust") to describe what in the conventional sense is a trust enforce-
able in the courts, and to use Lord Selbome LC's compound phrase "trust in the 
higher sense" to express the governmental obligation that he describes. 
I retw·n to the principles or considerations which the Kinloch case appears to sup-
port. The third is that it seems clear that the determination whether an instrument has 
created a true trust or a trust in the hjgher sense is a matter of construction, looking at 
the whole of the instrument in _question, its nature and effect, and, I think, its context. 
Fourth, a material factor may be the form of the description given by the instrument 
to the person alleged to be the trustee. An impersonal description of him, in the form 
of a reference not to an individual but to the holder of a particular office for the time 
being, may give some indication that what is intended is not a true trust, but a trust in 
the higher sense. 
[On the burden of proof, MegatTy V-C commented as fo11ows (at 222) on a proposi-
tion presented. by counsel for the attorney general in Tito:] 
This was that if the Crown was a trustee at all, it would always be a trustee in the 
higher sense unless there was enough to show that it was intended to be a trustee in 
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the lower sense. The burden, said counsel, was thus in effect on counsel for the plain-
tiffs to show that there was a true trust. Another way of putting much the same point 
is to emphasise the possible explanations that there are for a transaction. In the case 
of an individual, there will often be only two feasible explanations, either that he 
holds on a true trust, or else that he holds on no trust at all, but at most subject to a 
mere moral obligation. In the case of the Crown, there is a third possible explanation, 
namely, that there is a trust in the higher sense, or governmental obligation. Though 
this latter type of obligation is not enforceable in the courts, many other means are 
available of persuading the Crown to honour its governmental obligations, should it 
fail to do so ex mero motu. This is accordingly no mere moral obligation; and it can 
provide a satisfactory and probable explanation of a transaction which has been con-
ducted with formalities which suggest that more than a mere moral obligation was 
intended. Without putting matters on the basis of any "burden of proof," the existence 
of this alternative explanation when the alleged trustee is the Crown means that the 
courts will be ready to adopt it unless there is a sufficient indication that instead a true 
trust was intended. 
[On the facts, Megarry V-C concluded (at 226) that "the surrounding circumstances, 
as well as the terms of the documents, do very little to support the concept of any true 
trust." He therefore concluded that the Crown was not a trustee and did not owe fidu-
ciary obligations to the Banabans. Instead, he found, at 237, that the Crown's obliga-
tions were "governmental" in nature, arising from a political trust or "trust in the 
higher sense," and were therefore unenforceable in the courts, even though " there 
have been grave breaches of those obligations.") 
The political trust doctrine presented a potential barrier to Aboriginal peoples in Canada_ 
who claimed that the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to them. In Guerin v. The Queen 
(1982), 143 DLR (3d) 416, the Federal Court of Appeal relied on the doctrine to deny a 
claim against the Crown by the Musqueam Nation in British Columbia. On appeal, 
however, the ~upreme Court of Canada reconsidered the issue and reversed the Federal 
Court of Appeal's judgment in what is still the leading decision on the federal Crown's 
fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples.24 
24 The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin v. The Queen, (1984] 2 SCR 335 (reproduced in 
part, below) did not, however, entirely terminate the application of the political trust doctrine to Aborigi-
nal claims. In R v. Vincent, [1993] 2 CNLR 165, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied ·Rustomjee v. The 
Queen (1876), 2 QBD 69 (CA) and Civilian War Claimants v. The King, f 1932] AC 14 to deny 
Aboriginal peoples the benefit of the customs exemption they were supposed to receive from the Jay 
Treat)~ 1794, entered into by the British Crown and the United States. Lacourciere JA, for the court, 
wrote, at 176: " In an international treaty with a sovereign state, the Crown cannot be the fiduciary or 
agent of a subject, nor can a subject be the beneficiary of a trust." 
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II. THE CROWN'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
Tn our parliamentary system, there are three branches of g<:>vemment: the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary. In applying fiduciary law to the Crown- Aboriginal relation-
ship, the Supreme Court had to decide which of these branches are subject to fiduciary 
obligations. The court began by applying fiduciary principles to the executive branch-
specifically, the federal Department of Indian Affairs-in the Guerin case. 
A. Obligations Owed by the Executive 
Guerin v. The Queen 
[1984) 2 SCR 3352s 
[Guerin involved a claim by the Musqueam Nation against the Crown in right of 
Canada in relation to a surrender of a portion of their reserve, which is located in the 
city of Vancouver. A "reserve" is defined in the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5, s. 2(1), 
in part, as "a tract of land, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, that has 
been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band."26 Reserve lands 
cannot be sold, conveyed, or leased by a band for whom they have been set apart, 
except by way of surrender of their interest to the Crown.27 
Tn 1957, the Shaughnessy Heights Golf Club offered to lease 160 acres of the 
Musqueam Reserve for a 75-year term. The offer was made to the district superin-
tendent of the Indian Affairs branch, who presented it at a Musqueam Band Council 
25 For commentary on the Guerin decision, see Richard H. Bartlett, "You Can't Trust the Crown: The 
Fiduciary Obligation of the Crown Lo the Indians: Guerin v. The Queen" (1984-85), 49 Saskatchewan 
Law Review 367-74 and "The Fiduciary Obligation of the Crown to the Indians" (1989), 53 Saskatch-
ewan Law Review 301-25; John Hurley, "The Crown's Fiduciary Duty and Indian Title: Guerin v. The 
Queen" (1985), 30 McGill Law Journal 559-602; Darlene M. Johnston, "A Theory of Crown Trust 
Towards Abo1·iginal Peoples" (1986), 18 Ottawa Law Review 307-32; D. Paul Emond, "Case Comment: 
Guerin v. The Queen" (1986), 20 Estates andTrnsts Reports 61 -97; Maureen Ann Donohue, "Aboriginal 
Land Rights in Canada: A Historical Perspective on the Fiduciary Relationship" ( 1990), 15 American 
Indian Law Review 369-89; Camilla Hughes, "The Fiduciary Obligations of the Crown to Aborigines: 
Lessons from the United States and Canada" (1993), 16 University of New South Wales /,aw Journal 70-
96; David P. Owen, "Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples: Devolution in Action" (1994), 3 
Canadian Native I.Aw Reporter 1-24; Rotman, supra note 23, esp. at 88-110; Law Commission of 
Canada and Association of Iroquois and Allied Indians, eds., In Whom We Trust: A Fornm on Fiduciary 
Relationships (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002); James I. Reynolds, A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations 
and Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2005), esp. at 25-82. 
26 Note that "band" is defined in part, in the same section of the Indian Act, as "a body of Indians (a) for 
whose use and benefit in common, lands, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty, have been set 
apart before, on or after September 4, 1951." In these respects, the definitions of "reserve" and "band" 
arc substantially the same as those in effect when the events giving rise to the Guerin case took place: see 
RSC 1952, c. 149, ss. 2(l)(a) and (o). 
27 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. 1-5, ss. 31-38, as amended by RSC 1985, c. 17 (4th Supp.), s. 2 (at the time of 
the surrender of reserve lands in Guerin, RSC 1952, c. 149, ss. 37-38). 
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meeting in April of that year.28 However, copies of the Shaughnessy offer were not 
given to the council members, nor were all the proposed terms revealed to them. 
Acting on the information they were given, the band council passed a resolution at 
the meeting that approved the lease of the lands in principle. At a subsequent band 
councH meeting in September, attended by representatives of the golf club, the coun-
cil negotiated an annual rent of $29,000 instead of the proposed figure of $25,000, 
but this was still substantially less than rent amounting to 5 percent of the value of the 
land, which was what the council had asked for. The council agreed to the lesser 
amount because its members were led to believe by the Indian Affairs officials who 
were present that their demand that the rent be renegotiable in 10 years and every 5 
years thereafter was acceptable. Council members also objected to any ceiling on 
future rent increases and were told that their concern would be conveyed to the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs. 
The September band council meeting was followed by a "surrender meeting" of 
the band members in October. According to the trial judge's factual findings, which 
the Supreme Court accepted, at that meeting the members assumed or understood 
that, aside from the first period, the renegotiation periods would be every 10, not 15, 
years, and the golf club's proposed 15 percent limitation on rent increases would not 
be included in the lease. Also, they were not told that a term of the lease would allow 
the golf club to remove any buildings and other improvements from the land during 
the lease and up to six months after its termination. Moreover, two other terms that 
were never presented to the band council or band members subsequently appeared in 
the lease. The first provided that, failing agreement on future rent increases, the mat-
ter would be determined by arbitration on the basis of the rental value of the land in 
uncleared, unimproved condition and used as a golf course. Second, the golf club, 
not the Crown, was given the right to. terminate the lease at the end of any 15-year 
period by giving 6 months' notice. 
On the inaccurate and incomplete information provided to them by the Indian 
Affairs officials, the band members voted overwhelmingly to approve a surrender of 
162 acres of their reserve to the Crown "in trust to lease" so that it could be leased to 
the golf club for 75 years.29 On January 22, 1958, the Crown and the golf club signed 
the lease. After the surrender meeting, the band council and band members were not 
consulted respecting the final terms of the lease, nor were they given a copy of it until 
12 years later. According to one Indian Affairs official who testified at trial, the terms 
bore little resemblance to those discussed with the band members at the surrender 
meeting, and the trial judge agreed. He found that they would not have accepted the 
sunender if .they had been aware of the terms that would actually appear in the lease.30 
28 The band council, which is either elected or chosen according lo the custom of the band, is the governing 
body of an Indian band under the Indian Act. 
29 This was in accordance with the surrender provision in the Indian Act, RSC 1952, c. 149, s. 39(1), now 
RSC 1985, c. 1-5, s. 39(1). 
30 Guerin v. The Queen, supra note 24, per Wilson J, at 348, and Dickson J, at 370-71. 
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In three separate judgments, eight members of the Supreme Court of Canada unani-
mously restored the trial judge's decision awarding damages of $10,000,000 to tbe 
Musqueam. Estey J, writing his own judgment, found the Crown liable on the basis 
of agency. Dickson J (as he then was), delivering a judgment for himself, Beetz, 
Chouinard, and Lamer JJ, based liability on breach of a fiduciary duty by the Crown. 
Wilson J, along with Ritchie and Mcintyre JJ, also found the Crown to be liable, but 
unlike Dickson J, she decided that liability arose from breach of an express trust that 
had been created at the time of the surrender, prior to which the Crown had nonethe-
less owed fiduciary obligations to the Musqueam Nation. Portions of Dickson J's 
judgment follow. 
DICKSON J (at 375-89):] 
IV Fiduciary Relationship 
The issue of the Crown's liability was dealt' with in the courts below on the basis of 
the existence or non-existence of a trust. In dealing with tbe different consequences 
of a "true" trust, as opposed to a "political" trust, Le Dain J noted that the Crown 
could be liable only if it were subject to an "equitable obligation enforceable in a 
court of law." I have some doubt as to the cogency of the terminology of "higher" and 
"lower" trusts, but I do agree that the existence of an equitable obligation is the sine 
qua non for liability. Such an obligation is not, however, limited to relationships which 
can be strictly defined as "trusts." As will presently appear, it is my view that the 
Crown's obligations vis-a-vis the Indians cannot be defined as a tmst. That does not, 
however, mean that the Crown owes no enforceable duty to the Indians in the way in 
which it deals with Indian land. 
In my view, the nature of Indian title and the framework of the statutory scheme 
established for disposing of Indian land places upon the Crown an equitable obliga-
tion, enforceable by the courts, to deal with the land for the benefit of the Indians. 
This obligation does not amount to a trust in the ptivate law sense. It is rather a fidu-
ciary duty. If, however, the Crown breaches this fiduciary duty it will be liable to the 
Indians in the same way and to the same extent as if such a trust were in effect. 
The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots in the 
concept of aboriginal, native or Indian title. The fact that Indian Bands have a certain 
interest in lands does not, however, in itself give rise to a fiduciary relationship 
between the Indians and the Crown. The conclusion that the Crown is a fiduciary 
depends upon the further proposition that the Indian interest in the land is inalienable 
except upon surrender to the Crown. 
An Indian Band is prohibited from directly transferring its interest to a third party. 
Any sale or lease of land can only be carried out after a surrender has taken place, 
with the Crown then acting on the Band's behalf. The Crown first took this responsi-
bility upon itself in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It is sti11 recognized in the sur-
render provisions of the Indian Act. The surrender requirement, and the responsibil-
ity it entails, are the source of a distinct :fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to 
the India.ns. In order to explore the character of this obligation, however, it is first 
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necessary to consider the basis of aboriginal title and the nature of the interest in land 
which it represents. 
(a) The Existence of Indian Title 
In Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313, this Court rec-
ognized aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indians' historic occupation 
and possession of their tribal lands. With Judson and Hall JJ writing the principal 
judgments, the Court split three-three on the major issue of whether the Nishga Indi-
ans' aboriginal title to their ancient tribal territory had been extinguished by general 
land enactments in British Columbia. The Court also split on the issue of whether the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 was applicable to Indian lands in that province. Judson 
and Hall JJ were in agreement, however, that aboriginal title existed in Canada (at least 
where it had not been extinguished by appropriate legislative action) independently 
of the Royal Proclamation. Judson J stated expressly that the Proclamation was not the 
"exclusive" source oflndian title (pp. 322-23, 328). Hall J said (at p. 390) that "aborigi-
nal Indian title does not depend on treaty, executive order or legislative enactment." .. . 
In Johnson v. M'Intosh [8 Wheat. 543 (1823)] Marshall CJ, although he acknowl-
edged the Proclamation of 1763 as one basis for recognition of Indian title, was none-
theless of opinion that the rights of Indians in the lands they traditionally occupied 
prior to European colonization both predated and sm-vived the claims to sovereignty 
made by various European nations in the territories of the North American continent. 
The principle of discovery which justified these claims gave the ultimate title in the 
land jn a particular area to the nation which had discovered and claimed it. In that 
respect at least the Indians' rights in the land were obviously diminished; but their 
rights of occupancy and possession remained unaffected. Marshall CJ explained this 
principle as follows, at pp. 573-74: 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discov-
ery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements 
upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans would interfere. It was a right which all 
asserterl for themselves, an<l t·o the assertion nf which, hy olhers, all :tSSP.nte<l . 
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to 
be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power 
could interpose between them. In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the 
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to 
a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightjitl occupants of the 
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according 
to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, 
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that dis-
covery gave exclusive title to those who made it. [Dickson J's emphasis.] 
The principle that a change in sovereignty over a particular territory does not in 
general affect the presumptive title of the inhabitants was approved by the Privy Coun-
cil in Amodu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary), [1921] 2 AC 399. That principle 
·.:, 
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supports the assumption implicit in Calder that Indian title is an independent legal 
right which, although recognized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, nonetheless 
predates it. For this reason Kinloch v. Secretary of State.for India in Council, supra; 
Tito v. Waddell (No. 2), supra, and the other "political trust'" decisions are inapplica-
ble to the present case. The "political trust" cases concerned essentially the distribu-
tion of public funds or other prope1ty held by the government. In each case the party 
claiming to be beneficiary under a trust depended entirely on statute, ordinance or 
treaty as the basis for its claim to an interest in the funds in question. The situation of 
the Indians is entirely different. Their interest in their lands is a pre-existing legal 
right not created by Royal Proclamation, bys. 18(1) of the Indian Act, or by any other 
executive order or legislative provision. 
It does not matter, in my opinion, that the present case is concerned with the interest 
of an Indian Band in a reserve rather than with unrecognized aboriginal title in tradi-
tional tribal lands. The Indian interest in the land is the same in both cases: seeAttorney-
General for Quebec v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada, [1921] 1AC401, at pp. 41-11 
(the Star Chrome case). It is worth noting, however, that the reserve in question here 
was created out of the ancient tribal tell'itory of the Musqueam Band by the unilateral 
action of the Colony of British Columbia, prior to Confederation. 
(b) The Nature of Indian Title 
In the St. Catherine's Milling case [St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. 
The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46], the Privy Council held that the Indians had a 
"personal and usufructuary right" in the lands which they had traditionally occupied. 
Lord Watson said that "there has been all along vested in the Crown a substantial and 
paramount estate, underlying the Indian title, which became a plenum dominium 
whenever the title was surrendered or otherwise extinguished" (at p. 55). He reiterated 
this idea, stating that the Crown "has all along had a present proprietary estate in the 
land, upon which the Indian title was a mere burden" (at p. 58). This view of aborigi-
nal title was affirmed by the Plivy Council in the Star Chrome case. In Amodu Tijani, 
supra, Viscount Haldane, adverting to the St. Catherine's Milling and Star Chrome 
decisions, explained the concept of a usufructuary right as "a mere qualification of or 
burden on the radical or final title of the Sovereign ... " (p. 403). He described the 
title of the Sovereign as a pure legal estate, but one which could be qualified by a 
right of "beneficial user" that did not necessarily take the form of an estate in land. 
Indian title in Canada was said to be one illustration "of the necessity for getting rid 
of the assumption that the ownership of land naturally breaks itself up into estates, 
conceived as creatures of inherent legal principle." Chief Justice Marshall took a simi-
lar view in Johnson v. M'Intosh, supra, saying, "All our institutions recognize the 
absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy ... " (p. 588) .... 
It is true that in contexts other than constitutional the characterization of Indian 
title as "a personal and usufructuary right" has sometimes been questioned. In Calder, 
supra, for example, Judson J intimated at p. 328 that this characterization was not 
helpful in determining the nature of Indian title. In Attorney-General for Canada v. 
Giroux (1916), 53 SCR 172, Duff J, speaking for himself and Anglin J, distinguished 
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St. Catherine's Milling on the ground that the statutory provisions in accordance with 
which the reserve in question in Giroux had been created conferred beneficial owner-
ship on the Indian Band which occupied the reserve. In Cardinal v. Attorney General 
of Alberta, [1974] SCR 695, Laskin J, dissenting on another point, accepted the pos-
sibility that Indians may have a beneficial interest in a reserve. The Alberta Court of 
Appeal in Western International Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd., [1979] 
3 WWR 631, accepted the proposition that an Indian Band does indeed have a bene-
ficial interest in its reserve. In the present case this was the view as well of Le Dain J 
in the Federal Court of Appeal. See also the judgment of Kellock J in Miller v. The 
King, [1950] SCR 168, in which he seems implicitly to adopt a similar position. None 
of these judgments mentioned the Star Chrome case, however, in which the Indian 
interest in land specifically set aside as a reserve was held to be the same as the 
"personal and usufructuary right" which was discussed in St. Catherine's Milling. 
It appears to me that there is no real conflict between the cases which characterize 
Indian title as a beneficial interest of some sort, and those which characterize it as a 
personal, usufructuary right. Any apparent inconsistency derives from the fact that in 
describing what constitutes a unique interest in land the courts have almost inevitably 
found themselves applying a somewhat inappropriate terminology drawn from gen-
eral property law. There is a core of truth in the way that each of the two lines of 
authority has described native title, but an appearance of conflict has nonetheless 
arisen because in neither case is the categorization quite accurate. 
Indians have a legal right to occupy and possess certain lands, the ultimate title to 
which is in the Crown. While their interest does not, strictly speaking, amount to 
beneficial ownership, neither is its nature completely exhausted by the concept of a 
personal right. It is hue that the sui generis interest which the Indians have in the land 
is personal in the sense that it cannot be transfened to a grantee, but it is also true, as 
will presently appear, that the interest gives Iise upon sunender to a distinctive fidu-
ciary obligation on the part of the Crown to deal with the land for the benefit of the 
surrendering Indians. These two aspects oflndian title go together, since the Crown's 
original purpose in declaring the Indians' interest to be inalienable otherwise than to 
the Crown was to facilitate the Crown's ability to represent the Indians in dealings 
with third parties. The nature of the Indians' interest is therefore best characterized 
by its general inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obliga-
tion to deal with the land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is surrendered. Any 
description of Indian title which goes beyond these two featmes is both unnecessary 
and potentially misleading. 
(c) The Crown's Fiduciary Obligation 
The concept of fiduciary obligation originated long ago in the notion of breach of 
confidence, one of the original heads of jurisdiction in Chancery. In the present 
appeal its relevance is based on the requirement of a "surrender" before Indian land 
can be alienated. 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 provided that no private person could purchase 
from the Indians any lands that the Proclamation had reserved to them, and provided 
...... 
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further that all purchases had to be by and in the name of the Crown, in a public 
assembly of the Indians held by the governor or commander-in-chief of the colony in 
which the lands in question lay. As Lord Watson pointed out in St. Catherine's Milling, 
supra, at p. 54, this policy with respect to the sale or transfer Of the Indians' interest in 
land has been continuously maintained by the British Crown, by the governments of 
the colonies when they became responsible for the administration of Indian affairs, 
and, after 1867, by the federal government of Canada. Successive federal statutes, 
predecessors to the present Indian Act, have all provided for the general inalienability 
of Indian reserve land except upon surrender to the Crown, the relevant provisions in 
the present Act being ss. 37-41. 
The purpose of this surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown 
between the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so as to pre-
vent the Indians from being exploited. This is made clear in the Royal Proclamation 
itself, which prefaces the provision making the Crown an intermediary with a decla-
ration that "great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the 
Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the 
said Indians .... "Through the confirmation in the Indian Act of the historic responsi-
bility which the Crown has undertaken, to act on behalf of the Indians so as to protect 
their interests in transactions with third parties, Parliament has conferred upon the 
Crown a discretion to decide for itself where the Indians' best interests really lie. This 
is theeffectofs. 18(1) oftheAct. 
[Section 18(1) reads: 
18(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, reserves shall be held by Her Majesty 
for the use and benefit of the respective bands for which they were set apart; and sub-
ject to this Act and to the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may 
determine whether any purpose for which lands in a reserve are used or are to be used is 
for the use and benefit of the band.] 
This discretion on the part of the Crown, far from ousting, as the Crown contends, 
the jurisdiction of the comts to regulate the relationship between the Crown and the 
Indians, has the effect of transforming the Crown's obligation into a fiduciary one. 
Professor Ernest Weinrib maintains in his article The Fiduciary Obligation (1975), 
25 UTLJ 1, at p. 7, that "the hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that the relative legal 
positions are such that one party is at the mercy of the other's discretion." Earlier, at 
p. 4, he puts the point in the following way: 
[Where there is a fiduciary obligation] there is a relation in which the principal's inter-
ests can be affected by, and are therefore dependent on, the manner in which the fiduci-
ary uses the discretion which has been delegated to him. The fiduciary obligation is the 
law's blunt tool for the control of this discretion. 
I make no comment upon whether this description is broad enough to embrace all 
fiduciary obligations. I do agree, however, that where by statute, agreement, or per-
haps by unilateral undertaking~ one party has an obligation to act for the benefit of 
'•;' 
::,. 
. r 
920 Chapter 16 Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples 
another, and that obligation carries with it a discretionary power, the party thus em-
powered becomes a fiduciary. Equity will then supervise the relationship by holding 
him to the fiduciary's strict standard of conduct. 
It is sometimes said that the nature of fiduciary relationships is both established 
and exhausted by the standard categories of agent, trustee, partner, director, and the 
like. I do not agree. It is the nature of the relationship, not the specific category of 
actor involved that gives rise to the fiduciary duty. The categodes of fiduciary, like 
those of negligence, should not be considered closed. See, e.g. Laskin v. Bache & Co. 
Inc. (1971), 23 DLR (3d) 385 (Ont. CA), at p. 392; Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill (1974), 
7 OR 216 (Ont. CA), at p. 224. 
It should be noted that fiduciary duties generally arise only with regard to obliga-
tions originating in a piivate Jaw context. Public law duties, the performance of which 
requires the exercise of discretion, do not typically give rise to a fiduciary relation-
ship. As the "political trust" cases indicate, the Crown is not normally viewed as a 
fiduciary in the exercise of its legislative or administrative function. The mere fact, 
however, that it is the Crown which is obligated to act on the Indians' behalf does not 
of itself remove the Crown's obligation from the scope 9f the fiduciary principle. As 
was pointed out earlier, the Indians' interest in land is an independent legal interest. It 
is not a creation of either the legislative or executive branches.of government. The 
Crown's obligation to the Indians with respect to that interest is therefore not a public 
law duty. While it is not a private law duty in the strict sense either, it is nonetheless in 
the nature of a private law duty. Therefore, in this sui generis relationship, it is not 
improper to regard the Crown as a fiduciary. 
Section 18(1) of the Indian Act confers upon the Crown a broad discretion in dealing 
with surrendered land. In the present case, the document of sunender, set out in part 
earlier in these reasons, by which the Musqueam Band smTendered the land at issue, 
confirms this discretion in the clause conveying the land to the Crown "in trust to 
lease ... upon such terms as the Government of Canada may deem most conducive to 
our Welfare and that of our people." When, as here, an Indian Band surrenders its 
interest to the Crown, a fiduciary obligation takes hold to regulate the manner in which 
the Crown exercises its discretion in dealing with the land on the Indians' behalf. 
I agree with Le Dain J that before sun-ender the Crown does not hold the land in 
tmst for the Indians. I also agree that the Crown's obligation does not somehow crys-
tallize into a trust, express or implied, at the time of surrender. The law of trusts is a 
highly developed, specialized branch of the law. An express trust requires a settlor, a 
beneficiary, a trust corpus, words of settlement, certainty of object and certainty of 
obligation. Not all of these elements are present here. Indeed, there is not even a trust 
corpus. As the Smith decision [Smith v. The Queen, [1983] l SCR 554] makes clear, 
upon unconditional surrender the Indians' right in the land disappears. No property 
interest is transferred which could constitute the trust res, so that even if the other 
indicia of an express or implied trust could be made out, the basic requirement of a 
settlement of property has not been met. Accordingly, although the nature of Indian 
title coupled with the discretion vested in the Crown are sufficient to give rise to a 
fiduciary obligation, neither an express nor an implied trust arises upon surrender. 
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Nor does SlllTender give rise to a constructive trust. As was said by this Court in 
Pettkus v. Becker, [ 1980] 2 SCR 834, at p. 84 7, "The principle of unjust enrichment 
lies at the heart of the constructive trust." See also Rathwell v. Rath.well, (1978] 2 
SCR 436. Any similarity between a constructive trust and the Crown's fiduciary obli-
gation to the Indians is limited to the fact that both arise by operation of law; the 
former is an essentially restitutionary remedy, while the latter is not. In the present 
case, for example, the Crown has in no way been enriched by the surrender transac-
tion, whether unjustly or otherwise, but the fact that this is so cannot alter either the 
existence or the nature of the obligation which the Crown owes. 
The Crown's fiduciary obligation to the Indians is therefore not a trust. To say as 
much is not to deny that the obligation is trust-like in character. As would be the case 
with a trust, the Crown must hold surrendered land for the use and benefit of the 
surrendering Band. The obligation is thus subject to principles very similar to those 
which govern the law of trusts concerning, for example, the measure of damages for 
breach. The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians also bears a 
certain resemblance to agency, since the obligation can be characterized as a duty to 
act on behalf of the Indian Bands who have surrendered lands, by negotiating for the 
sale or lease of the land to third parties. But just as the Crown is not a trustee for the 
Indians, neither is it their agent; not only does the Crown's authority to act on the 
Band's behalf lack a basis in contract, but the Band is not a party to the ultimate sale 
or lease, as it would be if it were the Crown's p1incipal. I repeat, the fiduciary obliga-
tion which is owed to the Indians by the Crown is sui generis. Given the unique 
character both of the Indians' interest in land and of their historical relationship with 
the Crown, the fact that this is so should occasion no surprise. 
The discretion which is the hallmark of any fiduciary relationship is capable of 
being considerably narrowed in a particular case. This is as true of the Crown's dis-
cretion vis-a-vis the Indians as it is of the discretion of trustees, agents, and other 
traditional categories of fiduciary. The Indian Act makes specific provision for such 
narrowing in ss. 18(1) and 38(2). A fiduciary obligation will not, of course, be elimi-
nated by the imposition of conditions that have the effect of restricting the fiduciary's 
discretion. A failure to adhere to the imposed conditions will simply itself be a prima 
facie breach of the obligation. In the present case both the surrender and the Order in 
Council accepting the sunender refen-ed to the Crown's leasing the land on the Band's 
behalf. Prior to the surrender the Band had also been given to understand that a lease 
was to be entered into with the Shaughnessy Heights Golf Club upon certain terms, 
but this understanding was not incorporated into the surrender document itself. The 
effect of these so-called oral terms will be considered in the next section. 
( d) Breach of the Fiduciary Obligation 
The trial judge found that the Crown's agents promised the Band to lease the land in 
question on certain specified terms and then, after sun"ender, obtained a lease on dif-
ferent terms. The lease obtained was much less valuable. As already mentioned, the 
surrender docttment did not make reference to the "oral" terms. I would not wish to 
say that those terms had nonetheless somehow been incorporated as conditions into 
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the surrender. They were not formally assented to by a majority of the electors of the 
Band, nor were they accepted by the Governor in Council, as required by subss. 
39(1)(b) and (c). I agree with Le Dain J that there is no merit in the appellants' sub-
mission that for purposes of s. 39 a surrender can be considered independently of its 
terms. This makes no more sense than would a claim that a contract can have an 
existence which in no way depends on the terms and conditions that comprise it. 
Nonetheless, the Crown, in my view, was not empowered by the surrender docu-
ment to ignore the oral terms which the Band understood would be embodied in the 
lease. The oral representations form the backdrop against which the Crown's conduct 
in discharging its fiduciary obligation must be measured. They inform and confine 
the field of discretion within which the Crown was free to act. After the Crown's 
agents had induced the Band to surrender its land on the understanding that the land 
would be leased on certain terms, it would be unconscionable to permit the Crown 
simply to ignore those terms. When the promised lease proved impossible to obtain, the 
Crown, instead of proceeding to lease the land on different, unfavourable terms, should 
have returned to the Band to explain what had occurred and seek the Band's counsel 
on how to proceed. The existence of such unconscionability is the key to a conclusion 
that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty. Equity will not countenance unconscion-
able behaviour in a fiduciary, whose duty is that of utmost loyalty to his principal. 
While the existence of the fiduciary obligation which the Crown owes to the Indians 
is dependent on the nature of the sun-ender process, the standard of conduct which the 
obligation imports is both more general and more exacting than the terms on any 
particular surrender. In the present case the relevant aspect of the required standard of 
conduct is defined by a principle analogous to that which underlies the doctrine of 
promissory or equitable estoppel. The Crown cannot promise the Band that it will 
obtain a lease of the latter's land on certain stated terms, thereby inducing the Band to 
alter its legal position by SutTendering the land, and then simply ignore that promise to 
the Band's detriment. See, e.g. Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House 
Ltd., [1947] KB 130; Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, [1949] 1 KB 227 (CA). 
In obtaining without consultation a much less valuable lease than that promised, 
the. Crown breached the fiduciary obligation it owed the Band. It must make good the 
loss suffered in consequence. 
The Guerin decision rejected the application of the political trust doctrine to a surrender 
of reserve lands and held that the executive branch of the federal government does have 
legally enforceable obligations to Indian bands in that context. However, it also left many 
questions unanswered.31 Does the Crown have a fiduciary duty prior to a surrender (as 
Wilson J thought) and, if so, what is the extent of that duty? Does the Crown owe 
fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples generally, given that only Indians have 
31 See Bradford Morse, "Government Obligations, Aboriginal Peoples and Section 91(24) of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867," in David C. Hawkes, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and Government Responsibility: Exploring 
Federal and Provincial Roles (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), 59-91, at 80-88. 
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reserves? If so, in what contexts do those obligations arise? And what exactly is meant by 
"the Crown"? Does .Placement of the obligations on the Crown, which is represented by 
the executive, mean that the other branches of government 'have no fiduciary role? Ts the 
federal Crown alone bound by these fiduciary obligations, or do they apply to the 
provincial Crowns as well? We will see in the cases that follow that some of these 
questions have been answered since Guerin, while others remain unresolved. 
Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada 
(Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) 
[1995J 4 SCR 34432 
[Like Guerin, the Blueberry River case involved a surrender of reserve lands in Bri tish 
Columbia, this time by the Beaver Indian Band (the band) for whom this reserve near 
Fort St. John had been established pursuant to Treaty 8. In 1940, the band surren-
dered the mineral rights on its reserve to the Crown, "in trust to lease." In 1945, the 
band surrendered the reserve generally to the Crown, this time "in trust to sell or 
lease." From the Canadian government's perspective, the 1945 surrender was desir-
able because it made the agti cultural lands on the reserve available for grant to veter-
ans returning from World War 11 . As band members made their living by hunting and 
trapping and were thus not using the lands for fanning, it was thought that a reserve 
closer to their winter trap lines would be more suitable for them. Part of the $70,000 
that the Department ofindian Affairs (DIA) r~ceived in 1948 when it sold the reserve 
lands to the Director, the Veterans' Lands Act (DVLA) was in fact used to purchase 
other lands in 1950 for reserves nearer the band's trap lines. Contrary to DIA policy, 
however, the transfer of the lands to the DVLA did not contain a reservation of min-
eral rights. 
Between 1948 and 19 56, the lands of the original reserve were sold and transferred 
to veterans, again without any reservation of mineral rights. Oil and gas were discov-
ered on those lands in 1976, producing revenue for the veterans and their assigns 
estimated at $300 million. A concerned DIA official brought the matter to the attention 
of the Blueberry River and Doig River Indian bands (the bands), into which the Beaver 
Indian Band had by then been divided. He took them to see a lawyer and legal pro-
ceedings were commenced against the Crown for breach of its fiduciary obligations. 
Two judgments were delivered by the Supreme Court of Canada, both of which 
found the Crown liable on the basis of the principles laid down in Guerin. McLachlin 
J (as she then was) (Cory and Major JJ concurring) wrote the main judgment, but 
32 for commentary on the Bluebeny River case, see J. Paul Salembier, "Crown Fiduciary Duty, Indian Title 
and the Lost Treasure of IR 172: The Legacy of Apsassin v. The Queen," [ 1996) 3 Canadian Native law 
Reporter 1-24;' Owen B. Griffiths, "Case Comment on Blueberry River: Ts the Crown Fiduciary Obliga-
tion in the Currents of Change?," [ 1996] 3 Canadian Native Law Reporter 25-44. On distribution of the 
$147 million awarded to the plaintiffs, see Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northem Development) , [2001] 3 CNLR 72 (FCA); leave to appeal refused by the 
Supreme Court, October 4, 2001. 
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Gonthier J disagreed with some of her reasons; given that La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, 
and Sopinka JJ concurred with Gonthier J, his judgment is the majority decision on 
those points. 
McLACHLIN J summarized the facts and then proceeded, as follows (at 369-72 
and 373):] 
IL Analysis 
( 1) Pre-Surrender Duties and Breaches 
The Bands argue that the Crown was under a fiduciary obligation prior to the 1945 
surrender of the land to ensure that the Band did not enter into the surrender improvi-
dently. This raises the issue of the nature of the duty owed by the Crown when a band 
wishes to surrender its reserve. The Bands admit that in 1945 they wished to surren-
der the Fort St. John reserve in order to obtain other lands closer to its trap lines, and 
the remaining cash lump sum. They contend that the Crown should not have allowed 
them to make this surrender since, viewed in the long term, surrender was not in their 
best interest. 
(a) Whether the Indian Act Imposed a Duty on the Crown to Prevent the 
Surrender of the Reserve 
The first issue is whether the Indian Act imposed a duty on the Crown to refuse the 
Band's surrender of its reserve. The answer to this question is found in Guerin v. The 
Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335, where the majority of this Court, per Dickson J (as he then 
was), held that the duty on the Crown with respect to surrender of Indian lands was 
founded on preventing exploitative bargains. 
The Bands contend that the Indian Act imposed a duty on the Crown to refuse to 
allow the Band to surrender its lands in light of its interest in the land and the pater-
nalistic scheme of the Indian Act. When a reserve is granted to a band, as was done 
here in 1916, title does not pass to the band. Rather the Crown holds the fee simple 
title. The Crown thus possesses power with respect to those lands and must, it is 
argued, exercise that power as a fiduciary on behalf of the band. This is reinforced by 
the paternalistic tone of the Indian Act, which it is argued imposes a duty upon the 
Crown to protect the Indians from themselves and prevent them from making fooEsh 
decisions with respect to their land. This is why, it is submitted, title remains in the 
Crown. The Crown, on the other hand, paints the Band as an independent agent with 
respect to the sun-ender of its lands. 
My view is 'that the Indian Act's provisions for surrender of band reserves sttike a 
balance between the two extremes of autonomy and protection. The band's consent 
was required to surrender its reserve. Without that consent the reserve could not be 
sold. But the Crown, through the Governor in Council, was also required to consent 
to the surrender. The purpose of the requirement of Crown consent was not to substi-
tute the Crown's decision for that of the band, but to prevent exploitation. As Dickson J 
characterized it in Guerin (at p. 383): 
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The purpose of this surrender requirement is clearly to interpose the Crown between 
the Indians and prospective purchasers or lessees of their land, so as to prevent the 
Indians from being exploited. 
It follows that under the Indian Act, the Band had the right to decide whether to 
surrender the reserve, and its decision was to be respected. At the same time, if the 
Band's decision was foolish or improvident-a decision that constituted exploita-
tion- the Crown could refuse to consent. In short, the Crown's obligation was lim-
ited to preventing exploitative bargains. 
Subject to the issue of the value of the reserve and the matter of mineral rights, 
which I deal with later, the evidence does not supp01t the view that the surrender of 
the Fort St. John reserve was foolish, improvident or amounted to exploitation. In 
fact, viewed from the perspective of the Band at the time, it made good sense. The 
measure of control which the Act permitted the Band to exercise over the surrender 
of the reserve negates the contention that absent exploitation, the Act imposed a fidu-
ciary obligation on the Crown with respect to the surrender of the reserve. 
(b) Whether the Circumstances of the Case Gave Rise to a Fiduciary Duty on 
the Crown with Respect to the Surrender 
If the Indian Act did not impose a duty on the Crown to block the surrender of the 
reserve, the further question arises whether on the particular facts of this case a fidu-
ciary relationship was superimposed on the regime for alienation of Indian lands con-
templated by the Indian Act. 
Generally speal<lng, a fiduciary obligation arises where one person possesses uni-
lateral power or discretion on a matter affecting a second "peculiarly vulnerable" 
person: see Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99; Norberg v. Yfynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226; 
and Hodgkinson v. Simms, L1994] 3 SCR 377. The vulnerable party is in the power of 
the party possessing the power or discretion, who is in turn obligated to exercise that 
power or discretion solely for the benefit of the vulnerable party. A person cedes (or 
more often finds himself in the situation where someone else has ceded for him) his 
power over a matter to another person. The person who has ceded power trusts the 
person to whom power is ceded to exercise the power with loyalty and care. This is 
the notion at the heart of the fiduciary obligation. 
The evidence suppo1ts the view that the Band trusted the Crown to provide it with 
information as to its options and their foreseeable consequences, in relation to the 
sun-ender of the Fort St. John reserve and the acquisition of new reserves which would 
better ~ujt its life of trapping and hunting. It does not support the contention that the 
Band abnegated or entrusted its power of decision over the sun-ender of the reserve to 
the Crown .... 
I conclude that the evidence does not support the existence of a fiduciary duty on 
the Crown prior to the surrender of the reserve by the Band. 
[McLachlin J went on to conclude that failure to comply with some technicalities of 
the surrender provisions in the· Indian. Act did not invalidate the 1945 surrender, and 
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finished her discussion of pre-surrender duty and breach, at 375, with the conclusion 
that "the Bands have not established that the Crown wrongly failed to prevent the 
surrender of the Fort St. John reserve in 1945." She continued, at 375-78 and 379-82:] 
(2) Post-Surrender Duties and Breaches Regarding Surface Rights 
The 1945 smTender conveyed the Band's lands to the Crown "in trust to sell or lease 
the same to such person or persons, and upon such terms as the Government of the 
Dominion of Canada may deem most conducive to our Welfare and that of our people" 
(emphasis added). The Crown concedes lhat this swTender imposed a fiduciary duty 
on the Crown with respect to the subsequent sale or lease of the lands: Guerin, supra. 
The only issue is whether the Crown breached that duty when in 1948 it sold the 
lands to the DVLA for $70,000. 
The duty imposed upon the Crown by the terms of surrender (converted to a statu-
tory duty by s. 54 of the Act) was broad. It extended not only to the monetary aspects 
of the transaction, but to whether the arrangement would be conducive to the welfare 
of the Indians in the broader sense. The Bands argue that the Crown breached this 
duty by: (a) failing to consider leasing rather than selling the land; (b) selling the land 
under value; and (c) not resto1ing the reserve to the Band after surrender in view of its 
impoverished situation. I will consider each allegation in turn. 
(a) Failure to Consider Leasing Rather than Sale of the Surface Rights 
The trial judge held that the Crown considered the best interests of the Band in dis-
posing of the land and that, viewed from the perspective of the time, the sale of the 
land to the Department of Veterans Affairs was in fact in the best interests of the 
Band. He held that the Band was interested in obtaining reserves nearer to its hunting 
and trapping grounds. If the surface rights had been leased rather than sold, the Band 
might not have had enough money up front to purchase replacement lands. 
[McLachlin J reviewed the evidence on this issue and concluded:] 
In the face of this evidence, it cannot be said that Addy J eITed in concluding that 
the sale of the land to the DVLA was not in breach of the Crown's fiduciary duty. A 
number of options- lease, partial sale and outright sale-were considered. The inter-
ests and wishes of the Band were given utmost consideration throughout. The choice 
that was made- to sell the land- possessed the advantage of allowing the Band to 
get other lil.nds nearer its trap lines. At the time, that was a defensible choice. Indeed, 
it can be argued that the sale of the surface rights was the only alternative that met the 
Band's apparent need to obtain land nearer its trap lines. In retrospect, with the de-
cline of trapping and the discovery of oil and gas, the decision may be argued to have 
been unfortunate. But at the time, it may be defended as a reasonable solution to the 
problems the Band faced. 
I 
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(b) Sale at Undervalue 
The trial judge was correct in find ing that a fiduciary involved in self-dealing, i.e . in a 
conflict of interest, bears the onus of demonstrating that its personal interest did not 
benefit from its fiduciary powers: J.C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries (1981), at 
pp. 157-59; and A.H. Oosterhoff, Text, Commentary and Cases on Trusts (4th ed. 
1992). The Crown, facing conflicting political pressures in favour of preserving the 
land for the Band on the one hand, and making it available for distribution to veterans 
on the other, may be argued to have been in a position of conflict of interest. 
More problematic is the tlialjudge's conclusion that the Crown failed to discharge 
the onus of showing the price of $70,000 to be reasonable. While the DIA received a 
higher appraisal, there were also appraisals giving lower value to the land. In fact, 
there appears to have been no alternate market for the land at the time, which might 
be expected to make accurate appraisal difficult. The evidence reveals the price was 
anived at after a coW'se of negotiations conducted at arm's length between the DIA 
and the DVLA. 
This evidence does not appear to support the b.ial judge's conclusion that the Crown 
was in breach of its fiduciary obligation to sell the land at a fair value. In finding a 
breach despite this evidence, the trial judge misconstrued the effect of the onus on the 
Crown. The Crown adduced evidence showing thal lhe sale price lay within a range 
established by the appraisals. This raised a prima facie case that the sale price was 
' reasonable. The onus then shifted lo the Bands to show it was umeasonablc. The 
Bands did not adduce such evidence. On this state of the record, a presumption of 
breach of the Crown's fiduciary duty to exact a fair price cannot be based on a failure 
to discharge the onus upon it. l note that the tiial judge made no finding as to the true 
value of the property, nor any finding that it was significantly greater than $70,000, 
defeITing this to the stage of assessment of damages. 
I conclude that the tii al judge erred in concluding that the Crown breached its 
fiduciary duty to the Band by selling the land for $70,000. 
(c) flailure to Restore the Surface Rights to the Band After the 1945 SmTCnder 
The Bands argue that they should have been given their reserve back because of their 
apparent impoverishment between 1945 and 1961. The Crown, in the Bands' submis-
sion, should have realized that the sun-ender had been a mistake. Instead of confirm-
ing the mistake by selling the land to the DVLA, it should have cancelled the sun-en-
der and lnnsferred the land back to the Band. 
There can be no doubt that the Band lived in abject poverty and ill-health between 
1945 and 1961. The problem the Bands' argument faces is that their condition ap-
pears to have been unrelated to possession of the Fort St. John reserve. In fact, the 
Band did nqt make significant use of the reserve from 1916 to 1945, one of the pri-
mary reasons behind the move to surrender it and purchase more suitable property. 
Nor did the Band make much use of the land from 1945 to 1950 when alternative 
lands were purchased, despite the fact that it was entitled to use the land dudng this 
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period. Finally, the purchase of new lands in 1950 did not, by the Bands' own admis-
sion, alleviate the situation. 
Accepting that the Band was living in poverty, one cannot infer that the soll;ltion 
was to cancel the 1945 sun-ender or refuse to sell the Fort St. John reserve land. The 
Crown cannot be said to have breached the fiduciary duty it owed the Band after 
surrender of the Fo1t St. John reserve by failing to restore the land to the Indians. 
(d) Conclusions on Post-Surrender Duty and Breach with Respect to 
Surface Rights 
I conclude that the Bands have not established breach of fiduciary duty with respect 
to the sale of the surface iights. 
( 3) Post-Surrender Duties and Breaches Regarding Mineral Rights 
The Band surrendered "Petroleum and Natural Gas and the mining rights in connec-
tion therewith" in the Fort St. John reserve to the Crown in 1940, "in trust to lease the 
same to such person or persons, and upon such terms as the Government of Canada 
may deem most conducive to our welfare and that of our people." Section 54 of the 
1927 Indian Act required the Crown to hold these lands for the purpose specified in 
the surrender-for lease for the benefit of the Band. The right to explore for minerals 
was leased in 1940 for $1,800 .. In 1948, by means which to this day remain the sub-
ject of debate, the mineral rights were t:rnnsfeITed to the DVLA and hence to the 
veterans who took up the Fort St. John land. When oil and gas were discovered on the 
lands in 1976, it was not the Indians, but the veterans and their assigns, who obtained 
the revenues that flowed from the mineral rights. 
To this resume must be added two additional uncontested facts. First, at the time 
the mineral rights passed to the DVLA, and hence to the veterans, the Indians were 
unsophisticated and may not have fully understood the concept of different interests 
in land and how they might be lost. Second, they were never advised of the transfer of 
the mineral rights to the DVLA. They discovered it only in 1977, when an employee 
of the DIA brought to their attention that oil and gas had been discovered on their 
former lands and queried how the mineral rights had come to be transferred from the 
Band to the veterans. 
The trial judge held that the mineral rights were not severable from the su1face 
rights and consequently passed to the DVLA with the general surrender of the re-
serve in 1945. He failed to consider whether the earlier suITender of the mineral rights 
raised special considerations and imposed special obligations on the Crown. He fur-
ther held that. the Crown acted properly with respect to the mineral rights because 
they were not considered valuable at the time. In my view, he en-ed on both counts. 
[McLachlin J went on to deal at length with the effect of the 1940 and 1945 surren-
ders on the mineral rights. As Gonthier J, for the majority, disagreed with her on this, 
the portions of his judgment, summarizing her opinion and stating his own position, 
are reproduced below. 
McLachlin J then turned to the following issue, at 396-400 and 401:] 
"··, 
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(c) Did the Transfer of the Mineral Rights in 1948 Constitute a Breach of 
Fiduciary.Duty? 
Until 1948 the DIA held the SUlface rights and the mineral rights in tmst for the 
Indians, pursuant to the smTenders of 1945 and 1940 respectively. Jn 1948, after con-
cluding negotiations for the reserve, it assigned the land to the DVLA. The assign-
ment did not reserve out mineral rights despite the fact that the Crown had no right to 
sell them under the terms of the 1940 surrender and s. 54 of the Act, and despite the 
fact that they had not been mentioned in the negotiations leading to the sale and appear 
to have played no role in determining the price paid. Since the transfer to the DVLA 
did not reserve out the mineral rights, and since the DIA had always held legal title to 
both the mineral rights and the surface rights, the transfer must be taken to have 
legally passed the mineral rights as well as the surface rights: Attorney-General of 
British Columbia v. Attorney-General of Canada (1889), 14 AC 295 (PC). So the 
DVLA, without ever having sought them, found itself in possession of the mineral 
rights. The DVLA in turn passed the mineral rights on to the veterans as they met the 
terms of their agreements for sale, in the form of original Crown grants, pursuant to 
s. 5(2) of The Veterans' Land Act, 1942 (later RSC 1952, c. 280, s. 5(3)). 
Years later, wonderment persisted as to why the mineral rights had been passed to 
the DVLA. The wonderment was understandable given the well-known policy of the 
DIA to reserve out mineral rights and the fact that the only interest of the DVLA was 
to obtain land for agricultural purposes, not to enrich veterans through procuring min-
eral rights for them. The best explanation of how the mineral rights came to be trans-
ferred to the DVLA appears to lie jn simple inadvertence .... 
There exist two grounds for arguing that transfer of the minerals to the DVLA in 
1948 constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by the Crown. The first argument is that 
the transfer breached the 1940 sunender of the minerals, which restricted the DIA to 
leasing them for the benefit of the Band. A fiducfary is at very least bound to adhere 
to the terms of the instrnment which bestows his powers and creates the trust. 
In any event, even if one were to accept for the sake of the argument that the 1945 
surrender revoked the 1940 surrender of mineral rights, the 1945 surrender still im-
posed an obligation on the Crown to lease or sell in the best interests of the Band. This 
would leave for consideration the argument that the Crown breached its fiduciary obli-
gations by transferring the mineral rights to the DVLA in 1948, because transfer rather 
than reservation for future leasing was contrary to the best interests of the Indians. 
The trial judge rejected this argument on the ground that it was not foreseeable in 
1948 that the mineral rights could have any value .... 
The find ing of the tiial judge that the Crown could not have known in 1948 that 
the mineral tights might possess value flies in the face of the evidence on record. 
Accordfagly, this is one of those rare cases where depai1ure from a trial judge's find-
ing may be warranted. 
The Crown's own prior expe1icnce sufficed to establish that the mineral rights had 
actual and potential value. After taking the surrender in 1940, it issued a permit for 
prospecting for oil and gas on the properly. The 1940 permit alone was worth $1,800, 
a not insignificant sum given that the annual interest of 5 percent on the $70,000 
purchase price for the smface rights yielded about $3,500. 
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Moreover, the Crown had much earlier realized the potential value of mineral iights 
and roulinely excluded them from its grants .... 
If more were required, events close in time to 1948 reveal that these partic.ular 
mineral rights might have considerable value, if only from the point of view of rev-
enues from exploration rights .... 
The· matter comes down to this. The duty on the Crown as fiduciary was "that of a 
man of ordinary prudence in managing his own affairs": Fales v. Canada Permanent 
Trust Co., [1977] 2 SCR 302, at p. 315. A reasonable person does not inadvertently 
give away a potentially valuable asset which has already demonstrated earning poten-
tial. Nor does a reasonable person give away for no consideration what it will cost 
him nothing to keep and which may one day possess value, however remote the pos-
sibility. The Crown managing its own affairs reserved out its minerals. It should have 
done the same for the Band. 
(d) Conclusions on Post-Surrender Duty and Breach with Respect to 
Mineral Rights 
I conclude that the 1940 surrender of the mineral rights imposed a fiduciary duty to .:" 
the Band with respect to the mineral rights under the terms of the 1940 stmender, and 
that the DIA breached this duty by conveying the mineral rights to the DVLA. 
[Finally, McLachlin J dealt with the issue whether the claim was barred by applicable 
limitation periods. She found that the claim was barred with respect to breaches of 
fiduciary duty that occurred more than 30 years before the action was brought. How-
ever, as the Indian. Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 64 gave t11e DIA the power to revoke sales 
of sunendered reserve lands if made in error, the DIA could have revoked "the inad-
vertent, erroneous grant [in 1948] of the mineral rights to the DVLA up to the time 
they were transferred to veterans" (404). Failure to do so when it became aware of 
the enor and the potential value of the mineral rights constituted a breach of the 
Crown's fiduciary obligations. She wrote, at405-6:] 
In my view, the DIA was under a duty to use this power to rectify errors prejudic-
ing the interests of the Indians as part of its ongoing fiduciary duty to the Indians. The 
fiduciary duty associated with the administration of Indian lands may have termi-
nated with the sale of the lands in 1948. However, an ongoing fiduciary duty to act to 
correct error in the best interests of the Indians may be inferred from the exceptional 
nature of s. 64. That section gave the DIA the power to revoke erroneous grants of 
land, even as against bona fide purchasers. It is not unreasonable to infer that the 
enactors of the legislation intended the DIA to use that power in the best interests of 
the Indians. Ifs. 64 above is not enough to establish a fiduciary obligation to correct 
the e1rnr, it would certainly appear to do so, when read in the context of jurisprudence 
on fiduciary obligations. Where a patty is granted power over another's interests, and 
where the other party is correspondingly deprived of power over them, or is "vulner-
able," then the party possessing the power is under a fiduciary obligation to exercise 
it in the best interests of the other: Frame v. Smith, supra, per Wilson J; and 
... 
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Hodgkinson v. Simms, supra. Section 64 gave to DIA power to co1Tect the error that 
had wrongly conveyed the Band's minerals to the DVLA. The Band itself had no 
such power; it was vulnerable. ln these circumstances, a fiduciary duty to conect the 
error lies .... 
I conclude that the Crown, having first breached its fiduciary duty to the Indians 
by transferring the minerals to the DVLA, committed a second breach by failing to 
conect the error on August 9, 1949 when it learned of the error's existence and the 
potential value of the mineral rights. 
[As the bands could recover the value of mineral rights transferred by the DVLA 
within the 30-year limitation period, the case was sent back to trial to assess those 
damages. 
In the course of her discussion of the limitation issue, McLachlin J made signifi-
cant findings on the range of the Crown's fiduciary duty within federal government 
departments, at 403-4:] 
I earlier concluded that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty to the Band by inad-
vertently transferring the mineral rights to the DVLA, which in tum transferred them 
to the veterans who ultimately took up the reserve ]and. The Crown argues that since 
the inadvertent transfer was made in March 1948, the action for this breach is barred 
by the 30-year limitation period. 
Against this, the Bands argue that the 1948 transfer to the DVLA was not a trans-
fer at all, but merely an administrative allocation within the bosom of the unified 
Crown. Thus, the Crown's fiduciary duty continued, although it was transfc1Ted for 
administrative purposes to the DVLA after 1948. Consequenlly, the cause of action 
did not arise until the land was alienated from the DVLA to the veterans. 
I cannot accept this argument. Although the transfer was from one Crown entity to 
another, it remained a transfer and an alienation of title. First, the transfer converted 
the Band's interest from a property interest into a sum of money, suggesting aliena-
tion. Second, the continuing fiduciary duty proposed for the DVLA is problematic 
from a practical point of view. Any duty would have applied, at least in theory, both 
to the mineral rights and the suiface rights. Each sale to a veteran would have re-
quired the DVLA to consider not only those matters he was entitled to consider under 
his Act, but sometimes conflicting matters under the Indian Act. This would have 
made the sale in 1948 pointless from the DVLA's point of view and have rendered it 
impossible to administer. Moreover, it is not clear that the DVLA had any knowledge 
of the fiduciary obligations which bound the DIA. In fact, the DVLA and the DIA 
acted at arm's length throughout, as was appropriate given the different interests they 
represented and the different mandates of their statutes. In summary, the crystalliza-
tion of the property interest into a monetary sum and the practical considerations 
negating a duty in the DVLA toward the Band negate the suggestion that the 1948 
transfer changed nothing and that the real alienation came later. 
932 Chapter 16 Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples 
[Gonthier J agreed with McLachlin J's disposition of the case, but gave somewhat 
different reasons. 
GONTHIBR J (at 354-65):) 
l. Introduction 
I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of my colleague, McLachlin J. While I 
agree with her analyses of the surrender of the surface rights in Indian Reserve 172 
("IR 172"), and the application of the British Columbia Limitation Act, RSBC 1979, 
c. 236, and with her ultimate disposition of the case, I find that I cannot agree with 
her conclusion that the 1945 surrender of IR 172 to the Crown did not include the 
mineral rights in the reserve. In my view, the 1945 agreement constituted a complete 
surrender to the Crown of the smface and mineral rights in the SL John Indian Reserve, 
in trust, "to sell or lease." The Beaver Band's intention at the time of the 1945 suITen-
der, and the terms of the surrender instrument, bear this out. Moreover, while I agree 
with my coJleague that in dealing with the mineral rights subsequent to the 1945 
surrender, the Department of Indian Affairs ("DIA") committed a breach of fiduciary 
duty, my reasons are somewhat different. I set them out below. 
Tl. 11ie Effect of the 1945 Surrender of IR 172 on the 
1940 Surrender of the Mineral Rights in TR 172 
McLachlin J's position, in brief, is that since there had already been a surrender of the 
mineral rights in IR 172 for "lease" in 1940, these mineral rights could not have been 
included in the 1945 surrender. The basis of her position lies in the Indian Act, RSC 
1927, c. 98 scheme governing the transfer of reserve Jands to the Crown. Once such 
lands are surrendered, they become "Indian lands" under the Act. Section 2(e) of the 
Act defines "Indian lands" as follows: 
"lndian lands" means any reserve or portion of a reserve which has been surrendered to 
the Crown. 
It is therefore clear that "Indian lands" must constitute a "reserve or portion of a 
reserve." "Reserve" is defined in s. 2(j) of the Act: 
"reserve" means any tract or tracts of land set apart by treaty or otherwise for the use or 
benefit of or granted to a particular band of Indians, of which the legal title is in the 
Crown, and which remains so set apart and has not been surrendered to the Crown, and 
includes all the trees, wood, timber, soil, stone, minerals, metals and other valuables 
thereon or therein. 
MeLachlin J argues that when the Band surrendered the mineral rights in JR 172 to 
the Crown in 1940, this severed the mineral rights from the "reserve." The mineral 
rights thus constituted "Indian lands" under s. 2(e) of the Act, because they were a 
"portion of a reserve" which had been "surrendered." Therefore, the 1945 agreement 
could not have included the Band's rights over the minerals, since the surrendered 
"reserve," as defined in s. 2U) of the Act, was composed of only those portions of JR 
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172 which had not yet been surrendered. Furthermore, because the parties did not 
comply with certain administrative procedmes associated with the resurrender of 
reserve lands (i.e., the execution of a formal revocation document prior to resurrcnder), 
McLachlin J rejects the notion that the 1945 agreement constituted a revocation of 
the 1940 surrender of mineral rights for "lease," and a resurrender of those same 
rights "to sell or lease." She concludes that the 1940 surrender was unaffected by the 
1945 agreement, and thats. 54 of the Act prevented the DIA from selling the mineral 
rights since it was required to continue to lease the mineral rights according Lo the 
1940 terms .... 
In my view, the debate as to the juridical nature of the 1940 sunender is academic 
in the circumstances of this case, and the matter need not be determined here. Whether 
or not the l 940 smTendcr was actually governed by the 1927 Act, there has been no 
challenge to its legitimacy in this appeal. Nor should there be, since the Band gave its 
full and informed consent, the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary duty in relation to the 
surrender, and the parties complied with the statutory surrender procedures. My con-
clusion that the mineral rights in IR 172 were surrendered as part of the 1945 agree-
ment rests on reasoning unrelated to the scope of the statutory surrender regime, and 
therefore holds even if the mineral rights had attained the status of "Indian lands" 
through the 1940 dealings. This is because the ultimate issue to be determined in this 
case is the impact of the 1945 surrender of IR 172 on the earlier 1940 surrender of the 
mineral rights in IR 172, regardless of the latter's effectiveness. The 1927 Act is en-
tirely silent on the subjects of surrender variation , surrender revocation, and 
resunender, yet no one would seriously suggest that this silence renders all sun-en-
ders, including the 1940 agreement, permanent and irrevocable. In fact, the DIA de-
veloped its own administrative procedures for the revocation of a surrender, in order 
to facilitate resurrender and fill the void left by the statute. It is this statutory void 
which must be addressed here, and I do not think that the analysis is advanced by a 
finding one way or the other as to whether "Indian lands" are in dispute. 
To explain the impact of the 1945 surrender of lR 172 "to sell or lease" on the 
J 940 surrender of the mineral rights in IR 172 for "lease," both the appellants and the 
Crown have advanced different common law property concepts in support of their 
competing positions. The Crown's position, which is essentially that of the t.tialjudge, 
Addy J, is that the mineral rights were transferred in the 1945 smTender through the 
operation of the legal presumption that a general conveyance of land passes all inter-
ests except those specifically reserved in the deed of transfer. The appellants, whose 
position is adopted by my colleague McLachlin J, prefer the common law principle 
nemo dat quod non habet- a person cannot give what she does not possess. Accord-
ing to the reasons ofMcLachlin J, the Band could not surrender the mineral rights in 
IR 172 in 1945, since these rights had already been surrendered in 1940. 
In my view, principles of common law property are not helpful in the context of 
this case. Since Indian title in reserves is sui generis, it would be most unfortunate if 
the technical land transfer requirements embodied in the common law were to frus-
trate the intention of the parties, and in particular the Band, in relation to their deal-
ings with lR 172. For this reason, the legal character of the 1945 smTender, and its 
impact on the 1940 surrender, should be determined by reference to the intention of 
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the Band. Unless some statutory bar exists (which, as noted above, is not the case 
here), then the Band members' intention should be given legal effect. 
An intention-based approach offers a significant advantage, in my view. As 
McLachlin J observes, the law treats aboiiginal peoples as autonomous actors with 
respect to the acquisition and stmender of their lands, and for this reason, their deci-
sions must be respected and honoured. It is therefore preferable to rely on the under-
standing and intention of the Band members in 1945, as opposed to concluding that 
regardless of their intention, good fortune in the guise of technical land transfer rules 
and procedures rendered the 1945 surrender of mineral rights.null and void. In a case 
such as this one, a more technical approach operates to the benefit of the aboriginal 
peoples. However, one can well imagine situations where that same approach would 
be detiimental, frustrating the well-considered plans of the aboriginals. In my view, 
when determining the legal effect of dealings between aboriginal peoples and the 
Crown relating to reserve lands, the sui generis nature of aboiiginal title requiJ:es 
courts to go beyond the usual restrictions imposed by the common law, in order to 
give effect to the true purpose of the dealings. 
While McLachlin J dedicates a considerable portion of her reasons to an analysis 
of the Band's intention, the fact remains that under her approach, the Band's inten-
tion in 1945 is iffe1evant. Even if McLachlin J were to agree with my conclusion that 
the Band intended to surrender the mineral rights as part of the 1945 agreement, she 
would be forced to the conclusion that the mineral rights were not part of the 1945 
surrender because of her findings in relation to the 1927 Act, the operation of nemo 
dat quod non habet, and the administrative procedures adopted by the DIA for sur-
render revocation. Although McLachlin J and I might disagree on the Band's inten-
tion in this case, since I prefer to rely on the factual findings of the trial judge, I think 
that in principle an intention-based approach is preferable to my colleague's more 
technical reasoning. . .. 
The Band understood that by agreeing to the 1945 surrender, they would be trans-
ferring all their rights in IR 172 to the Crown in trust, and that the Crown would 
either se11 or lease those rights for the benefit of the Band. The sale or lease of IR 172 
by the Crown would provide the funds necessary for the Band to purchase alternate 
reserve sites better suited to their traditional hunting and gatheiing activities. The 
Band neither expected nor intended to hold rights over IR 172 once the 1945 surren-
der was completed. This was entirely appropriate, as my colleague McLachlin J points 
out, because IR 172 was virtually useless to the Band at the time .... 
Given the Band's intention vis-a-vis the 1945 surrender, and the terms of that sur-
render, Stone ~A, in the court below, concluded: 
It would seem to me that the overall effect of the 1945 transaction was essentially the 
same as might have been achieved by first cancelling the 1940 surrender with consent 
of the Indians followed by the acceptance of that cancellation by the Governor in Coun-
cil. According to the Trial Judge's finding the Indians agreed to the release of their 
rights in IR 172; their consent was reflected in the language of the formal surrender 
instrument and the SLUTender was afterwards accepted by the Governor in Council. 
([1993] 3 FC 28, at pp. 122-23.) 
. ·,;. 
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He therefore construed the 1945 surrender as a revocation of the 1940 agreement, 
and a transfer of lR 172, including the mineral rights, to the Crown " to sell or lease." 
Although the "revocation-resmTcnder" desc1iption offered by Stone JA is one plau-
sible construction of the 1945 agreement, I think that the true nature of the 1945 
dealings can best be characterized as a variation of a trust in Indian land. In 1940, the 
Band transferred the mineral rights in IR 172 to the Crown in trust, requiring the 
Crown to lease those rights for the benefit of the Band. The 1945 agreement was also 
framed as a trust, in which the Band sutTendered all of its 1ights over IR 172 to the 
Crown "to sell or lease." The 1945 agreement subsumed the 1940 agreement, and 
expanded upon it in two ways: first, while the 1940 surrender concerned mineral 
rights only, the 1945 suITender covered all rights in IR 172, including both mineral 
rights and surface rights; and second, while the 1940 surrender constituted a trust for 
"lease," the 1945 surrender gave the Crown, as trustee, the discretion " to sell or lease." 
This two-pronged variation of the 1940 trust agreement afforded the Crown consider-
ably greater power to act as a fiduciary on behalf of tbe Band. Of course, under the 
terms of the trust, and because of the Crown's fiduciary role in the dealings, the DIA 
was required to exercise its enlarged powers in the best interests of the Band. 
I should add that my reasons should not be interpreted to equate a trust in Indian 
land with a comm.on law trust. I am well aware that this issue was not resolved in 
Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335, and l do not wish to pronounce upon it in 
this case. However, this Court did recognize in Guerin that " trust-like" obligations 
and principles would be relevant to the analysis of a surrender of Indian lands. In this 
case, both the 1940 and 1945 surrenders were framed as trusts, and the parties there-
fore intended lo create a tmst-lik.e relationship. Thus, for lack of a better label, I think 
that it is appropriate to refer to these surrenders as trusts in Indian land. 
I should also add that I would be reluctant lo give effect to this sun-ender variation 
if I thought that the Band 's understanding of its terms had been inadequate, or if the 
conduct of the Crown had somehow tainted the dealings in a manner which made it 
unsafe to rely on the Band's understanding and intention. However, neither of these 
situations arises here. As the tri al judge found, the consequences of the 1945 surren-
der were fully explained to the Indians by the local agent of the DIA duling the nego-
tiations. There was also substantial compliance with the technical surrender require-
ments embodied in s. 51 of the 1927 Indian Act, and as McLachlin J concludes, the 
evidence amply demonstrates the valid assent of the Band members to the 1945 agree-
ment. Moreover, by the terms of the surrender instrument, the DIA was required to 
act in the best interests of the Bandin dealing with the mineral rights. In fact, the DIA 
was under a fiduciary duty to put the Band's interests first. I therefore see nothing 
during the negotiations prior to the 1945 surrender, or in the terms of the surrender 
instrument, which would make it inappropriate to give effect to the Band's intention 
to surrender all their rights in IR 172 to the Crown in trust "to sell or lease." In fact, 
the guiding principle that the decisions of aboriginal peoples shou Id be honoured and 
respected leads me to the opposite conclusion. 
I therefore conclude that under the 1945 agreement, both the surface rights and the 
mineral rights in IR 172 were surrendered to the Crown in trust "to sell or lease." 
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Ill. Breach of Fiducia1y Duty by the DIA Subsequent to the 1945 Surrender 
The terms of the 1945 surrender transferred IR 172 to the Crown "in trust to sell or 
lease the same to such person or persons, and upon such terms as the Government of 
the Dominion of Canada may deem most conducive to our Welfare and that of our 
people." By taking on the obligations of a trnstcc in relation to IR 172, the DIA was 
under a fiduciary duty to deal with the land in the best interests of the members of the 
Beaver Band. This duty extended to both the surface rights and the mineral rights. 
In my view, it is critical to the outcome of this case that the 1945 agreement was a 
surrender in trust, to sell or lease. The terms of the trust agreement provided the DIA 
with the discretion to sell or lease, and since the DIA was under a fiduciary duty vis-
a-vis the Band, it was required to exercise this discretion in the Band's best interests. 
Of equal importance is the fact that the 1945 surrender gave the DIA a virtual carte 
blanche to determine the terms upon which IR 172 would be sold or leased. The only 
li mitation was that these terms had to be "conducive" to the "welfare" of the Band. 
Because of the scope of the discretion granted to the DIA, it would have been open to 
the DIA to sell the surface rights in IR 172 to the Director, The Veterans' Land Act 
("DVLA"), while continuing to lease the mineral rights for the benefit of the Band, as 
per the l 940 surrender agreement. 
Why this option was not chosen is a mystery. As my colleague McLachlin J ob-
serves, the DIA had a long-standing policy, pre-dating the 1945 surrender, to reserve 
out mineral rights for the benefit of the aboriginal peoples when smrnndered Indian 
lands were sold off. This policy was adopted precisely because reserving mineral rights 
was thought to be "conducive to the welfare" of aboriginal peoples in all cases. The 
existence and rationale of this policy (the wisdom of which, though obvious, is evi-
denced by the facts of this case) justifies the conclusion that the DIA was under a 
fiduciary duty to reserve, for the benefit of the Beaver Band, the mineral rights in JR 
172 when it sold the surface rights to the DVLA in March 1948. In other words, the 
DIA should have continued to lease the mineral rights for the benefit of the Band as it 
had been doing since 1940. Its failure to do so can only be explained as "inadvertence." 
The DIA's failure to continue the leasing arrangement could be excused if the 
Department had received a clear mandate from the Band to sell the mineral rights. As 
I stated above, the Band's intention leads me to the conclusion that both the surface 
and mineral rights in IR 172 were included in the 1945 sun-ender. However, the 1945 
surrender was "to sell or lease." At no time during the negotiations leading to the 
1945 agreement was the sale of the mineral rights discussed specifical ly. The authori-
zation given encompassed leasing as weJl as selling. There was therefore no clear 
authorization from the Band which justified the DIA in departing from its long-stand-
ing policy of reserving mineral rights for the benefit of the aboriginals when surface 
rights were sold. This underscores the critical distinction between the Band's inten-
tion to include the mineral rights in the 1945 surrender, and an intention of the Band 
that the mineral rights must be sold and not leased by the Crown. Given these circum-
stances, the DIA was under a fiduciary duty to continue the leasing ruTangement which 
had been established in the 1940 surrender. It was a violation of the fiduciary duty to 
sell the mineral rights to the DVLA in 1948. 
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[Gonthier J went on to agree with McLachlin J that the DIA had a fiduciary duty to 
use its statutory authority to revoke the sale of the mineral rights to the DVLA before 
the transfer of the lands lo the veterans. The bands were'therefore entitled to recover 
any losses resulting from breach of that duty, to the extent that those losses were not 
ball"ed by the applicable limitation period.] 
The Guerin and Blueberry River cases both involved lhe Crown's fiduciary obligations in 
the context of surrenders of Indian reserve lands. Fiduciary obligations arc also owed 
when the Crown exercises statutory authority to expropriate reserve lands.33 
Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town) 
[2001J 3 SCR 74634 
[In 1925, the provjnce of British Columbia built a concrete-lined irrigation canal 
across the Osoyoos First Nation's reserve in the Okanagan Valley. The Osoyoos First 
Nation did not surrender the land on which the canal was built, nor was the land 
formally expropriated by lhe Crown. In 1957, the Canadian government by order in 
council transferred the land to the province pursuant to s. 35(3) of the Indian Act, 
RSC 1952, c. 149,35 and the province gave the town of Oliver authority to operate 
and maintain the canal. In 1994, the Osoyoos First Nation passed a taxation bylaw 
pursuant to s. 83 of the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5, imposing property taxes on its 
reserve lands. For this bylaw to apply to the land on which the irrigation canal had been 
built, the land had to be pait of the reserve. This raised the issue of the effect of the 1957 
order in council. Specifically, did the order vest the foe simple in the land in the Crown 
in right of British Columbia or did it merely give the province a lesser interest such as 
an easement without extinguishing the Osoyoos First Nation's interest in the land? 
33 In addition to Osoyoos Indictn Bct11d v. Oliver (Town), L2001] 3 SCR 746, see Kruger v. The Queen 
( 1985), 17 DLR (4th) 591 (leave to appeal refu sed, [1985] 2 SCR viii), where the Federal Court of 
Appeal accepted that the federal Crown owed a fiduciary duty to the Pentic too Indian Band io the 
context of expropriation of parL of their reserve for an airport. The majority nonetheless held that the 
duly had been fulfilled on the facts. See also Cctnadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988) 2 SCR 654; Hopton v. 
Pamajewon (1993), 16 OR (3d) 390 (CA). The Kruger case also addressed the controversial issue of the 
Crown's conflict of interest in this kind of situation: see discussion in Rotman, supra note 23, at 273-80. 
On this, see also Eastmain Band v. Ca11ada (Federal Administrator), (1993] 3 CNLR 55 (FCA); Blue-
berry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and No rt hem Development), [ 1995] 4 
SCR 344, reproduced, in part, above; Wewaykum lndian Band v. Canada, [200214 SCR 245, reproduced, 
in part, below. 
34 For commentary on Osoyoos, see Leonard I. Rotman, "Crown-Native Relations as Fiduciary: Reflections 
Almost Twenty Years A ftcr Guerin" (2003), 22 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 363-96. 
35 Section 35 permits the provinces, with the consent of the governor in council, to expropriate reserve 
lands by using any statutory authority they have to take lands without the consent of the owner. Section 
35(3) provides that, where the governor in council's consent has been given, "the Governor in Council 
may, in lieu of the province ... taking or using the lands without the consent of the owner, authorize a 
transfer or grant of such lands to the province." 
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Iacobucci J (McLachlin CJ, Binnie, AJbour, and LeBel JJ concmring) held that 
the province had acquired only an easement in the nature of a right-of-way, and so the 
Osoyoos First Nation had the authority to tax the land. Gonthier J (L'Heureux-Dube, 
Major, and Bastarache JJ concuning) dissented. The dissenting justices interpreted 
the order in council as giving the province full fee simple ownership of tbe land in 
question, thereby removing it from the reserve and placing it beyond the taxation 
authority of the Osoyoos First Nation. 
On the issue of the Crown's fiducim·y obligations in the context of a unilateral 
taking ofreserve lands, IACOBUCCI J stated (at 771-73):] 
4. The Content of the Crown's Fiduciary Duty in the Context of Section 35 
[51] The intervener the Attorney General of Canada submits that when Canada's 
public law duty conflicts with its statutory obligation to hold reserve lands for the use 
and benefit of the band for which they were set apart, then a fiduciary duty does not 
arise. The Attorney General argues that the existence of a fiduciary duty to impair 
minimally the Indian interest in reserve lands is inconsistent with the legislative pur-
pose of s. 35 which is to act in the greater public interest and that the opening phrase 
of s. 18(1) of the Indian Act, "Subject to the provisions of this Act ... ," effectively 
releases the Crown from its fiduciary duty in respect of s. 35 takings. In addition, the 
Attorney General contends that a fiduciary obligation to impair minimally the Indian 
interest in reserve lands is inconsistent with the principles of fiduciruy law which 
impose a duty of utmost loyalty on the fiduciary ro act only in the interests of the 
person to whom the duty is owed. Thus, the Attorney General submits that the hold-
ing in Guerin, supra, that the surrender of an Indian interest of land gives rise to a 
fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown to act in the best interests of the Indians does 
not extend to the context of expropriation, and that the duty of the Crown to the band 
in the case of an expropriation of reserve land is similar to its duty to any other land 
holder-to compensate the band appropriately for the loss of the lands. 
[52] In my view, the fiduciary duty of the Crown is not restricted to instances of 
sunender. Section 35 cleru·ly permits the Governor in Council to allow the use of 
reserve land for public purposes. However, once it has been determined that an ex-
propriation of Indian lands is in the public interest, a fiduciary duty arises on the patt 
of the Crown to expropriate or grant only the minimum interest required in order to 
fulfill that public purpose, thus ensuring a minimal impairment of the use and enjoy-
ment of Indian lands by the band. This is consistent with the provisions of s. 35 which 
give the Governor in Council the absolute discretion to prescribe the terms to which 
the expropriation or transfer is to be subject. In this way, instead of having the public 
interest trump the Indian interests, the approach I advocate attempts to reconcile the 
two interests involved. 
[53] This two-step process minimizes any inconsistency between the Crown's pub-
lic duty to expropriate ]ands and its fiduciary duty to Indians whose lands are affected 
by the expropriation. In the first stage, the Crown acts in the public interest in deter-
mining that an expropriation involving Indian lands is required in order to fulfill some 
public purpose. At this stage, no fiduciary duty exists. However, once the genera] 
. .~ 
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decision to expropriate has been made, the fiduciary obligations of the Crown aiise, 
requiring the Crown to expropriate an interest that will ~Ifill the public purpose while 
preserving the Indian interest in the land to the greatest e~tent practicable. 
[54] The duty to impair minimally Indian interests in reserve land not only serves 
to balance the public interest and the Indian interest, it is also consistent with the 
policy behind the rule of general inalienability in the Indian Act which is to prevent 
the erosion of the native land base: Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada, (1997] 2 
SCR 119, at para. 52. The contention of the Attorney General that the duty of the 
Crown to the band is rest1icted to appropriate compensation cannot be maintained in 
light of the special features of reserve land discussed above, in particular, the facts 
that the aboriginal interest in land has a unique cultural component, and that reserve 
lands cannot be unilaterally added to or replaced. 
rss] As the Crown 's fiduciary duty is to protect the use and enjoyment of the 
Indian interest in expropriated lands to the greatest extent practicable, the duty 
includes the general obligation, wherever appropriate, to protect a sufficient Indian 
interest in expropriated land in order to preserve the taxation jurisdiction of the band 
over the land, thus ensm'ing a continued ability to earn income from the land. Although 
in this case the taxation jurisdiction given to bands came after the Order in Council of 
1957, the principle is the same, namely that the Crown should not take more than is 
needed for the public purpose and subject to protecting the use and enjoyment of 
Indians where approp1iate. 
The Osoyoos decision demonstrates the Supreme Court's reliance on the Crown's fiduci-
ary obligations for the purpose of interpreting statutory takings of reserve land narrowly 
so as to preserve the land base of First Nations. In a signi ficant earlier decision, 
Semiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada, [1998) 1 CNLR 250, the Federal Court of Appeal 
held that the Crown, in acquiring reserve land under tlueat of expropriation for the 
alleged purpose of expanding a customs facility, had breached its fiduciary duty because 
it did not protect the band from exploitation and did not reconvey the land to the band 
when it became clear that the land was not needed for that purpose. Importantly, the 
remedy the court imposed for the failure to reconvey was a constructive trust, combined 
with compensation for lost use of the land during the time it had been held by the Crown. 
B. Obligations Owed by Parliament and Provincial Legislatures 
Before recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights by s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982,36 those rights were subject to the doctrine of parliamentruy suprem-
acy and could thus be infiinged or extinguished by federal legislation.37 As Sparrow 
reveals, s. 35(1) changed this by imposing a constitutional obligation on the Parliament 
of Canada to honour the Crown's fiduciary obligations and respect those rights. 
36 Sec text accompanying nole 7, supra. 
37 See R 11. Sikyea (1964), 43 DLR (2d) 150 (NWT CA); aff'd. f1 964) SCR 642; R v. George, [ 1966] SCR 
267; Daniels v. White and the Queen, [1968] SCR 5 l 7; R v. Verrikscm ( 1976), 71 DLR (3d) 159 (SCC). 
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R v. Sparrow 
[1990] 1 SCR 107538 
[The Sparrow case mose when Mr. Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Nation (the 
First Nation on whose behalf the Guerin. action, above, had been brought), was 
charged under regulations made pursuant to the Fisheries Act, RSC 1970, c. F-14 
(now RSC 1985, c. F-14) with fishing with a drift net that exceeded the length per-
mitted by the Musqueams' Indian food fishing licence. Sparrow admitted the facts 
but contended that he had been exercising an existing Aboriginal right to fish that was 
recognized and affirmed bys. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and that the net 
length restiiction was inconsistent with his constitutional rights and therefore inap-
plicable to him. 
Sparrow is a landmark case in Aboriginal rights law in Canada because in it, for 
the fast time, the Supreme Court interpreted and applied s. 35(1). B1iefly, in a unani-
mous judgment delivered by Dickson CJ and La Forest J, the court found that Spar-
row did have an existing Aboriginal right to fish. However, to invoke the protection of 
s. 35(1), Spru.rnw also bad to prove that this right had been infringed. If that could be 
established, the burden would then shift to the Crown to show, if it could, that the 
infringement was justified. This would involve proving, first of all, that there was a 
valid legislative objective behind the infringing legislation. Second, the court stated 
lhat "the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with aboriginal peoples [and 
thus l ... [t]he special trnst relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-a-
vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation 
or action in question can be justified" (at 1114). To justify the infringement, the Crown 
would therefore have to prove it had respected that relationship and met its responsi-
bilities. According to the court, questions to be addressed in determining this include 
whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired 
result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, 
whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conser-
vation measures [in the context of fishing] being implemented (at 1119). 
Where an Aboriginal right to fish for food is concerned, the court said that respect 
for that right means that it has to be given priority over commercial and sports fish-
ing. 39 As the evidence led at trial was insufficient to determine whether the fish net 
38 For a sampling of commentary on Sparrow, sec W.l.C. Binnie, "The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the 
End or End of the Beginning?" (1990), 15 Queen's Law Journal 217-53; Michael Asch and Patrick 
Macklem, "Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R v. Sparrow" (1991), 29 Alberta 
Law Review 498-517; Kent McNeil, "Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments" 
(1993), 19 Q11ee11 '.1· Law Journal 95-136, reprinted in Emerging .Justice?, supra note 8, at 184-214. Jlor a 
discussion of the issue of fiduciary duty in relation to Sparrow, sec Dupuis and McNeil, supra note 22, at 
43-47. 
39 Note that the court has not accorded the same priority to an Aboriginal right to fish for commercial 
purposes: see R v. Gladstone, (1996] 2 SCR 723, commented on in Kent McNeil, "How Can Infringe-
ments of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?" ( 1997), vol. 8, no. 2 Co11sti111-
1io11al Forum 33-39, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, supra note 8, at 281 -91. 
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restriction infringed Sparrow's Aboriginal right, and if so whether the infJingement 
could be justiiied, the court ordered a new trial to decide these issues. 
For our purposes, the following excerpts are the mos·t relevant parts of the Spar-
row decision, because they relate to the issue of fiduciary obligations. 
DICKSON CJ and La FOREST J (at 1103-9):] 
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was based 
on respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt 
that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands 
vested in the Crown; see Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823), 8 Wheaton 543 (USSC); see 
also the Royal Proclamation itself (RSC, 1985, App. II, No. 1, pp. 4-6); Calder [Calder 
v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973) SCR 313], per Judson J at p. 328, 
Hall J at pp. 383, 402. And there can be no doubt that over the years the rights of the 
Indians were often honoured in the breach (for one instance in a recent case in this 
Court, see Canadian Pac{fic Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 SCR 654). As MacDonald J stated 
in Pasco v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1986] 1 CNLR 35, at p. 37 (BCSC): 
"We cannot recount with much pride the treatment accorded to the native people of 
this countiy." 
For many years, the rights of the Indians to their aboriginal lands-certainly as 
legal rights-were virtually ignored. The leading cases defining Indian rights in the 
early part of the centu1y were directed at claims supported by the Royal Proclamation 
or other legal instrnments, and even these cases wt:rt: t:ssentially concerned with set-
tling legislative jurisdiction or the rights of commercial enterprises. For fifty years 
after the publication of Clement's The Law of the Canadian Constitution (3rd ed. 
1916), there was a virtual absence of discussion of any kind of Indian rights to land 
even in academic literature. By the late 1960s, aboriginal claims were not even rec-
ognized by the federal government as having any legal status. Thus the Statement of 
the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (1969), although well meaning, con-
tained the assertion (at p. 11) that "aboriginal claims to land .. . are so general and 
undefined that it is not realistic to think of them as specific claims capable of remedy 
except through a policy and program that will end injustice to the Indians as members 
of the Canadian community." In the same general period, the James Bay development 
by Quebec Hydro was originally initiated without regard to the rights of the Indians 
who lived there, even though these were expressly protected by a constitutional in-
strument; see The Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, 1912, SC 1912, c. 45. It took a 
number of judicial decisions and notably the Calder case in this Court (1973) to 
prompt a reassessment of the position being taken by government. ... 
It is clear, then, thats. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, represents the culmina-
tion of a long and difficult struggle in both the political forum and the cmu1s for the 
constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights. The strong representations of native 
associations and other groups concerned with the welfare of Canada's aboriginal 
peoples made the adoption of s. 35(1) possible and it is important to note that the 
provision applies to the Indians, the Inuit and the Metis. Section 35(1), at the least, 
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provides a solid constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take 
place. It also affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against provincial 
legislative power. We are, of course, aware that this would, in any event, flow from 
the Guerin case [Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335], but for a proper under-
standing of the situation, it is essential to remember that the Guerin case was decided 
after the conunencement of the Constitution Act, 1982. In addition to its effect on 
aboriginal rights, s. 35(1) clarified other issues regarding the enforcement of treaty 
lights (see Sanders, "Pre-existing Rights: The Aboriginal Peoples of Canada," in 
Beaudoin and Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and 'Freedoms, 2nd 
ed., especially at p. 730). 
In our opinion, the significance of s. 35(1) extends beyond these fundamental ef-
fects. Professor Lyon in "An Essay on Constitutional Interpretation" (1988), 26 
Osgoode Hall LJ 95, says the following abouts. 35(l), at p. 100: 
... the context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a codification of 
the case law on aboriginal rights that had accumulated by 1982. Section 35 calls for a 
just settlement for aboriginal peoples. It renounces the old rules of the game under 
which the Crown established courts of law and denied those courts the authority to 
question sovereign claims made by the Crown. 
The approach to be taken with respect to interpreting the meaning of s. 35(1) is 
derived from general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to 
aboriginal rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional provision itself. Here, 
we will sketch the framework for an interpretation of "recognized and affinned" that, 
in our opinion, gives appropriate weight to the constitutional nature of these words. 
In Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721, this Court said the 
following about the perspective to be adopted when interpreting a constitution, at p. 745: 
The Constitution of a country is a statement of the will of the people to be governed in 
accordance with certain principles held as fundamental and certain prescriptions re-
strictive of the powers of the legislature and government. It is, ass. 52 of the Constitu-
tional Act, 1982 declares, the "supreme law" of the nation, unalterable by the normal 
legislative process, and unsuffering of laws inconsistent with it. The duty of the judici-
ary is to interpret and apply the laws of Canada and each of the provinces, and it is thus 
our duty to ensure that the constitutional law prevails. 
The nature of s. 35(1) itself suggests that it be construed in a purposive way. When the 
purposes of the affirmation of aboriginal rights are considered, it is clear that a gener-
ous, liberal interpretation of the words jn the constitutional provision is demanded .... 
in Nowegijickv. The Queen., [1983] 1SCR29, at p. 36, the following principle that 
should govern the interpretation of Indian treaties and statutes was set out: 
... treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful 
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians. 
In R v. Agawa [(1988), 28 OAC 201], Blair JA stated that the above principle should 
apply to the interpretation of s. 35(1). He added the following principle to be equally 
applied, at pp. 215-lp: 
II. The Crown 's Ohligations tn the Aboriginal Peoples 
The second principle was enunciated by the late Associate Chief Justice MacK.innon in 
R v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 OR (2d) 360. He emphasized the importance of 
Indian history and traditions as well as the perceived effect of a treaty at the time of its 
execution. He also cautioned against determining Indian rights "in a vacuum." The hon-
our of the Crown is involved in the interpretation of Indian treaties and, as a conse-
quence, fairness to the Indians is a governing consideration. He said at p. 367: 
''The principles to be applied to the interpretation of Indian treaties have been 
much canvassed over the years. ln approaching the terms of a treaty quite apart 
from the other considerations already noted, the honour of the Crown is always 
involved and no appearance of 'sharp dealing' should be sanctioned." 
This view is reflected in recent judicial decisions which have emphasized the responsi-
bility of Government to protect the rights of Indians arising from the special trnst rela-
tionship created by history, treaties and legislation: sec Guerin v. the Queen, (19841 2 
SCR 335 .... 
943 
In Guerin, supra, the Musqueam Band surrendered reserve lands to the Crown for 
lease to a golf club. The terms obtained by the Crown were much less favourable than 
those approved by the Band at the surrender meeting. This Court found that the Crown 
owed a fiduciary obligation to the Indians with respect to the lands. The sui generis 
nature oflndian title, and the histolic powers and responsibility assumed by the Crown 
constituted the source of such a fiduciary obligation. In our opinion, Guerin, together 
with R v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 OR (2d) 360, ground a general guiding princi-
ple for s. 35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary 
capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government 
and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and 
affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship .... 
In response to the appellant's submission that s. 35(1) rights are more securely 
protected than the rights guaranteed by the Charter, it is true that s. 35(1) is not subject 
to s. 1 of the Charter. In our opinion, this does not mean that any law or regulation 
affecting aboriginal rights will automatically be of no force or effect by the operation 
of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Legislation that affects the exercise of aborigi-
nal rights will nonetheless be valid, if it meets the test for justifying an interference 
with a right recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1). 
There is no explicit language in the provision that authorizes this Court or any 
court to assess the legitimacy of any government legislation that restiicts aboriginal 
rights. Yet, we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fidu-
ciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise of 
sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal 
legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to 
Indians pursuant to s. 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, how-
ever, now be'read together withs. 35(1 ). In other words, federal power must be recon-
ciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand 
the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal 
rights. Such scrutiny is in keeping with the liberal interpretive principle enunciated in 
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Nowegijick, supra, and the concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of hon-
ourable dealing with respect to the aboriginal peoples of Canada as suggested by 
Guerin v. The Queen., supra. 
From the last paragraph of the above excerpt it seems that the Supreme Court, while 
describing the Crown-Aboriginal relati onship as trust-like, has accepted Dickson J's 
fiduciary classification of the Crown's obligations in Guerin. Moreover, those obligations 
have been extended far beyond the narrow context of a surrender of reserve lands, as the 
court found the government's "responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to 
aborig.inal peoples [to be a] general guiding principle for s. 35(1)."40 Given the definition 
of "aboriginal peoples of Canada" in s. 35(2),41 to whom then is the responsibility owed? 
What aspects of the relationship between the Aboriginal peoples and the Crown are 
subject to fiduciary obligations?42 
Regarding the meaning of "the Crown," we saw in Guerin that this term encompasses 
the executive branch of the federal government, because the persons who committed the 
breach of the fiduciary obligations in that case were employees of the Department of 
Indian Affairs. In Bluebeny River, however, the court was unwilling to extend the 
obligations to the Director, The Veterans' Land Act. In Sparrow, on the other hand, it was 
not executive action that was being challenged, but federal regulations, made by the 
governor in council acting legislatively under authority delegated by the Canadian Parlia-
ment in the Fisheries Act. Yet the Supreme Court said (at 1008) that the government's 
fiduciary responsibility is "a general guiding principle for s. 35(1)" and (at 1114) that 
"[t]he special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-a-vis aborigi-
nals must be the first consideration in determining whether the Legislation. or action in 
question can be justified" (emphasis added). 
Guerin, Blueberry River, Osoyoos, and Sparrow all involved federal fiduciary obliga-
tions to the Aboriginal peoples. Federal responsibility, at least where Indians and Inuit 
arc concerned, 43 is usually related to s. 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which gave 
Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians."44 In 
Guerin, Dickson J held that obligations respecting surrenders nf reserve lands are rooted 
in Aboriginal title and the restriction on alienation of that title other than by surrender to 
40 See Dupuis and McNeil, supra note 22, at 41-47. For further treatment by the Supreme Court of the 
fiduciary aspect of the Sparrow test, see R v. Badger, ( 1996) 1 SCR 771; R v. Gladstone, supra note 39; R 
v. Adams, (1996] 3 SCR 101; R v. Cote, [1996) 3 SCR 139; Delga11111u/...w v. British Columbia, (1997] 3 
SCR 1010 (reproduced, in part, below). 
41 See supra note 1 _and accompanying text. 
42 This question is examined in more detail under sections Ill and IV, below. 
43 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
44 Parliament's authority to enact the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c. I-5, for example, is clearly derived from s. 
91(24): see Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard, [L974J SCR 1349; Mitchell v. Peguis 
Indian Band, supra note 8, per Dickson CJ, at 105. In the latter case, al 126, La Forest J referred to the 
federal Crown's "obligations to native peoples, be it pursuant to its treaty commitments, or its responsi-
biliries flowing from s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867." 
II. The Crown's Obligations to the Aboriginal Peoples 
the Crown. Due to s. 91 (24 ), the federal Crown has exclusive authority to accept surren-
ders of aboriginal title,45 even though the benefit of surrenders within a province will go 
to the province in situations where the provincial Crown holds the underlying title to the 
lands.46 However, we know from Sparrow that federal responsibility extends beyond 
surrenders of land. The federal Crown's fiduciary obligations arise from a historical 
relationship and apply particularly in situations where the Crown has discretionary power 
that can be exercised to the detriment of the Aboriginal peoples.47 Where the federal 
government is concerned, the main constitutional source of that power is s. 91(24). 
The provinces do not have any broad auth01ity over Aboriginal peoples like that 
conferred on Parliament by s. 91 (24). However, this does not mean that provincial gov-
ernments do not owe fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples.48 Provincial legisla-
tion can have an impact on the Aboriginal peoples covered by s. 91 (24), as long as it does 
not single them out for special treatmcnt.49 To the extent that the provinces have discre-
tionary power over the Aboriginal peoples, they are also subject to fiduciary obligations.SO 
C. Fiduciary Obligations, the Courts, and Quasi-Judicial Federal Boards 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board) 
[1994] 1 SCR 159 
[National Energy Board arose out of a decision by the National Energy Board (NEB) 
to grant Hydro-Quebec licences to export electricity to New York and Vermont. The 
Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) and the Cree Regional Authority (herein 
referred to collectively as the Crees) opposed the licences because they were con-
cerned about the impact on their Aboriginal rights of future construction of hydro-
electric generating facilities in northern Quebec to meet Hydro-Quebec's obligations 
45 See Delgam11ukw v. British Columbia, supra note 40, per Lamer CJ, at 11 I 7- I 8. In Mitchell v. Peguis Indian 
Band, supra note 8, at 124, La Forest J said that "Indian treaties are matters of federal concern." (It is 
through treaties that Aboriginal title has been surrendered historically.) See also Dominion of Canada v. 
Province of Ontario, [1910) AC 637 (PC), at 644, where the federal government was said to have "acted 
upon the rights conferred by the Constitution" when it signed a land surrender treaty in 1873 in Ontario; 
Roberts v. Canada, [1989) 1 SCR 322, at 339-40, where the law of Aboriginal title was held to be "federal 
common law." However, federal authority in this regard does not prevent the province where the lands are 
located from participating in the process and approving the surrender agreement, which is why British 
Columbia is involved in land-claim negotiations taking place at present in that province. 
46 See Sr. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (PC). 
47 See Guerin v. 111e Queen, supra note 24, per Dickson J, at 384. 
48 Sec, generally, Leonard I. Rotman, "Provincial Fiduciary Obligations to First Nations: The Nexus 
Between Governmental Power and Responsibility" (1994), 32 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 735-83. 
49 Sec Dick v. Tile Queen, [1985) 2 SCR 309; Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (lvli11ister of Small 
Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] 2 SCR 146. 
50 See R v. Badger, supra note 40; R ·v. Cote, supra note 40; Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), [2004) 3 SCR 511. 
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under the export contracts. The Crees made numerous submissions at the public hear-
ing held by the NEB before it made its decision to grant the licences. In court, the 
Crees challenged the validity of the licences on the grounds, inter alia, that the NEB 
owed them a fiduciary duty that had not been fulfilled in the exercise of its decision-
making power and that the board's decision affected their Aboriginal rights and there-
fore had to meet the Sparrow justification test. Iacobucci J, delivering the unanimous 
decision of the court, dealt with these contentions in the following passage. 
IACOBUCCI J (at 182-86):] 
C. Fiduciary Duty 
The appellants claim that, by virtue of their status as aboriginal peoples, the Board 
owes them a fiduciary duty extending to the decision-making process used in consid-
ering applications for export licences. The appellants' argument is that the fiduciary 
duty owed to aboriginal peoples by the Crown, as recognized by this Court in R v. 
Sparrow [[1990] 1 SCR 1075], extends to the Board, as an agent of government and 
creation of Parliament, in the exercise of its delegated powers. The duty applies when-
ever the decision made pursuant to a federal regulatory process is likely to affect 
aborig;nal rights. 
The appellants characterize the scope of this duty as twofold. They argue that it 
includes the duty to ensure the full and fair patticipation of the appellants in the hear-
ing process, as well as the duty to take into account their best interests when making 
decisions. The appell ants ai·gue that such an obligation jmports with it rights that go 
beyond those created by the dictates of natural justice, and that in this case, at a mini-
mum, the Board should have required disclosure to lhe appellants of all information 
necessary to the making of their case against the applications. The respondents to this 
appeal, on the other hand, dispute both the existence of a duty, and, if it does exist, 
that the Board failed to meet it. 
It is now well settled that there is a fiduciary relationship between the -federal 
Crown and the aboriginal peoples of Canada: Guerin v. The Queen, (1984] 2 SCR 
335. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that not every aspect of the relationship 
between fiduciary and beneficiary takes the form of a fiduc iary obligation: Lac Min-
erals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., (1989] 2 SCR 574. The nature of 
the relationship between the parties defines the scope, and the limits, of the duties 
that will be imposed. The cowts must be careful not to compromise the independence 
of quasi-judicial tribunals and decision-making agencies by imposing upon them fi-
duciary obligations which require that their decisions be made in accordance with a 
fiduciary duty . . 
Counsel for the appellants conceded in oral argument that it could not be said that 
such a duty should apply to the courts, as a creation of government, in the exercise of 
their judicial function. Jn my view, the considerations which apply in evaluating 
whether such an obligation is impressed on the process by which the Board decides 
whether to grant a licence for export differ little from those applying to the courts. 
The function of the Board in this reg<!fd is quasi-judicial: Committee for Justice and 
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Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1SCR369, at p. 385. While this characteri-
zation may not carry with it all the procedural and other requirements identical to 
those applicable to a court, it is inherently inconsistent with the imposition of a rela-
tionship of utmost good faith between the Board and a party appearing before it. 
It is for this reason that I do not find helpful the authorities cited to me by the 
appell!:UltS as indicative of this evolving trend: Gitludahl v. Minister of Forests [[1994) 4 
CNLR 43 (BC SC)] and Dick v. The Queen [[1993] 1 CNLR 50 (FCTD)]. Those cases 
were concerned, respectively, with the decision-making of the Minister of Forests, 
and the conduct of the Crown when adverse in interest to aboriginal peoples in litiga-
tion. The considerations which may animate the application of a fiduciary duty in these 
contexts are far different from those raised in the context of a licence application before 
an independent decision-making body operating at arm's length from government. 
Therefore, I conclude that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the 
appellants does not impose a duty on the Board to make its decisions in the best 
interests of the appellants, or to change its hearing process so as to impose superadded 
requirements of disclosure. When the duty is defined in this manner, such tribunals 
no more owe this sort of fiduciary duty than do the courts. Consequently, no such 
duty existed in relation to the decision-making function of the Board. 
Moreover, even if this Comt were to assume that the Board, in conducting its 
review, should have taken into account the existence of the fiduciary relationship 
between the Crown and the appellants, I am satisfied that, for the reasons set out 
above relating to the procedure followed by the Board, its actions in this case would 
have met the requirements of such a duty. There is no indication that the appellants 
were given anything less than the fullest opportunity to be heard. They had access to 
all the evidence that was before the Board, were able to make submissions and argu-
ment in reply, and were entitled to cross-examine the witnesses called by the respond-
ent Hydro-Quebec. This argument must therefore fail for the same reasons as the 
arguments relating to the nature of the review conducted by the Board. 
D. Aboriginal Rights 
This Court, in R v. Sparrow, supra, recognized the interrelationship between the rec-
ognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights constitutionally enshrined in s. 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, and the fiduciary relationship which has historically ex-
isted between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is this relationship that indicates 
that the exercise of sovereign power may be limited or restrained when it amounts to 
an unjustifiable interference with aboriginal rights. In this appeal, the appellants argue 
that the decision of the Board to grant the licences will have a negative impact on 
their aboriginal rights, and that the Board was therefore required to meet the test of 
justification as set out in Sparrow. 
It is obvious that the Board must exercise its decision-making function, including 
the interpretation and application of its governing legislation, in accordance with the 
dictates of the Constitution, including s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. There-
fore, it must first be determined whether this particular decision of the Board, made 
pursuant to s. 119.08(1) of tl:ie National Energy Board Act, could have the effect of 
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interfering with the existing aboriginal rights of the appellants so as to amount to a 
primafacie infringement of s. 35(1 ). 
The respondents in this appeal argue that it cannot. They assert that, with the sign-
ing by the appellants of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, incorpo-
rated in the James Bay and Northern. Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act, SC 1976-
77, c. 32 ("the James Bay Act"), the appellants ceded and renounced all aboriginal 
rights except as set out in the Agreement. Since the act of granting a licence neither 
requires nor permits the construction of the new production facilities which the ap-
pellants claim will interfere with their rights, and since the Agreement itself provides 
for a participatory review process to authorize the construction of such facilities, 
Hydro-Quebec and the Attorney General of Quebec argue that no prima facie in-
fringement results from the decision of the Board. 
The evaluation of these competing arguments requires an examination and inter-
pretation of the Agreement as embodied in the .lames Bay Act. The appellants, how-
ever, requested that this question be determined without reference to the Agreement 
or to the Act, since its inte1pretation and application form the subject of other legal 
proceedings involving the parties to this appeal. The appellants accordingly placed 
no reliance on this document in their assertion of a breach of aboriginal rights. 
ln my view, it is not possible to evaluate realistically the impact of the decision of 
the Board ~,the rights of the appellants without reference to the James Bay Act. The 
respondents assert that the rights of the appellants are limited to those set out in this 
document. The validity of this assertion cannot be tested without construing the pro-
visions of the Agreement. 
Moreover, even assuming that the decision of the Board is one that has, prima 
facie, an impact on the aboriginal rights of the appellants, and that the appellants are 
correct in arguing that, for the Board to justify its interference, it must, at a minimum, 
conduct a rigorous, thorough, and proper cost-benefit review, l find, for the reasons 
expressed above, that the review canicd out in this case was not wanting in this respect. 
Iacobucci J disposed of the appeal by upholding the NEB's decision to grant the lkenr.es 
on the grounds that the NEB had exercised its jurisdiction properly by giving the Crees a 
full and fair opportunity to be heard and by reaching its conclusions on the basis of 
sufficient evidence. Is this decision consistent with the "general guiding principle for 
s. 35(1)" set out in Sparrow? Does it provide the federal government with a way of 
avoiding its fiduciary obligations lo the Aboriginal peoples? 
Ill. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND ABORIGINAL TITLE TO LAND 
We saw from Dickson J's judgment in Guerin that Abo1iginal title is deiived from the 
Aboriginal peoples' historical occupation of their traditional lands. The nature of Aboriginal 
title and the Crown's obligation to respect it were elaborated on in the Delgamuukw decision. 
III. Fiduciary Obligations and Ahoriein:il Title to Land 
Dclgamuukw v. British Columbia 
[1997] 3 SCR 1010 
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[In Delgarnuukw v. British Columbia, 51 the Gitksan and Wet'suwet' en nations claimed 
ownership and jurisdiction (changed during the course of the litigation to Aboliginal 
title and self-government) over their traditional territories-an area of 58,000 square 
kilometres in north-west British Columbia. While avoiding any decision on the mer-
its because of problems with the pleadings and with the trial judge's treatment of the 
plaintiffs' oral histories (the case was sent back to trial for these reasons, but has not 
in fact been retried), the Supreme Court established a number of important principles 
relating to content and proof of Aboriginal title and the constitutional protection ac-
corded to that title as an Aboriginal right recognized and affumed by s. 35(1) the 
Constitution Act, 1982.52 The issue of the Crown's fiduciary obligations came up·in 
the context of infringement of Aboriginal title and the application of the justificatory 
test ]aid down in the Sparrow decision. Lamer CJ, Cory, McLachlin, and Major JJ 
concurring, delivered the leading judgment. La Forest J, L'Heureux-Dube J concur-
ring, wrote a separate judgment. l 
LAMER CJ [at 1107-14]: 
(f) Infringements of Aboriginal Title: The Test of Justification 
(i) Introduction 
The aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed bys. 35(1), incluc:ling aboriginal title, 
are not absolute. Those rights may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g., Sparrow) 
and provincial (e.g., Cote ... [R v. Cote, [1996] 3 SCR 139]) governments. However, 
s. 35(1) requires that those infringements satisfy the test of justification. In this sec-
tion, I will review the Court's nascent jurisprudence on justification and explain how 
that test wi!J apply in the context of infringements of aboriginal title. 
(ii) General Principles 
The test of justification has two parts, which I shall consider in tum. First, the in-
fringement of the aboriginal dght must be in furtherance of a legislative objective 
that is compelling and substantial. I explained in Gladstone [R v. Gladstone, [ l 996) 2 
51 For commentary on the Delgamuukw decision, see Kent McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90s: 
Has the Supreme Court Finally Got It Right? (Toronto: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York 
University, 1998); Hamar Foster, "Aboriginal Title and the Provincial Obligation to Respect It: Is 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 'Invented Law'?" (1998), 56 The Advocate 221-31; Peter Russell, 
"High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: The Limits of Judicial Independence" (1998), 61 
Saskatchewan Law Review 247-76; Richard Bartlett, "The Content of Aboriginal Title and Equality 
Before the Law" (1998), 61 Saskatchewan Law Review 377-91; John Borrows, "Sovereignty's Alchemy: 
Analysis ofDelgamuukw v. British Columbia" (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 537. 
52 See also R v. Mars/tall; R v. Bernard, (2005] 2 SCR 220. 
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SCR 723) that compelling and substantial objectives were those which were directed 
at either one of the purposes underlying the recognition and affi rmation of aboriginal 
rights by s. 35(1), which are (at para. 72): 
... the recognition of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples or ... 
the reconciliation of aboriginal prior occupation with the assertion of the sovereignty 
of the Crown. 
I noted that the latter purpose will often "be most relevant" (at para. 72) at the stage 
of justification. I think it imp0ttant to repeat why (at para. 73) that is so: 
Because ... distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are part of, a broader so-
cial, political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there are 
circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial 
importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that aboriginal 
societies are part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be justifiable. 
Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with 
the broader political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights 
are, where the objec1ives furthered by those limits are of sufficient importance to the 
broader community as a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation. [Em-
phasis added; "equally" emphasized in original.] 
The conservation of fisheries, which was accepted as a compelling and substantial 
objective in Sparrow, furthers both of these pmposes, because it simultaneously rec-
ognizes that fishing is integral to many aboriginal cultures, and also seeks to recon-
cile aboriginal societies with the broader community by ensuring that there are fish 
enough for al I. But legitimate government objectives also include " the pursuit of eco-
nomic and regional fairness" and " the recognition of the historical reliance upon, and 
participation in, the fishery by non-aboriginal groups" (para. 75). By contrast, meas-
ures enacted for relatively unimpo11ant reasons, such as sports fishing without a sig-
nificant economic component (Adams ... [R v. Adams, ll 996] 3 .SCR 101]) would 
fail this aspect of the test of justification. 
The second part of the test of justification requires an ;;issP.ssment of whether the 
infringement is consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown 
and aboriginal peoples. What has become clear is that the requirements of the fidudary 
duty are a function of the "legal and factual context" of each appeal (Gladstone, supra, 
at para. 56). Sparrow and Gladstone, for example, interpreted and applied the fiduciary 
duty in terms of the idea of priority. The theory underlying that principle is that the 
fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples demands that abo-
riginal interests· be placed first. However, the fiduciary duty does not demand that 
aboriginal rights always be given priority. As was said in Sparrow, supra, at pp. 1114-15: 
The nature of the constitutional protection afforded bys. 35(1) ill this context demands 
that there be a link between the question of justification and the allocation of priorities 
in the fishery. [Emphasis added.] 
Other contexts permit, and may even require, that the fiduciary duty be articulated in 
other ways (at p. 1119): 
III. Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Title to Land 
Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be addressed, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the inquiry. These include the questions of whether there 
has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect 'the <;tesired result; whether, 
in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the aborigi-
nal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures 
being implemented. 
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Sparrow did not explain when the different articulations of the fiduciary duty should 
be used. Below, I suggest that the choice between them will in large part be a function 
of the nature of the aboriginal right at issue. 
In addition to variation in the form which the fiduciary duty talces, there will also 
be variation in degree of scrutiny required by the :fiduciary duty of the infringing 
measure or action. The degree of scrutiny is a function of the natnre of the aboriginal 
right at issue. The distinction between Sparrow and Gladstone, for example, turned 
on whether the right amounted to the exclusive use of a resource, which in turn was a 
function of whether the right had an internal limit. In Sparrow, the right was inter-
nally limited, because it was a right to fish for food, ceremonial and social purposes, 
and as a result would only amount to an exclusive right to use the fishery in excep-
tional circumstances. Accordingly, the requirement of pdority was applied strictly to 
mean that (at p. 1116) "any allocation of pri01ities after valid conservation measures 
have been implemented must give top priority to Indian food fishing." 
In Gladstone, by contrast, the right to sell fish commercially was only limited by 
supply and demand. Had the test for justification been applied in a strict form in 
Gladstone, the aboriginal right would have amounted to an exclusive right to exploit 
the fishery on a commercial basis. This was not the intention of Sparrow, and I ac-
cordingly modified the test for justification, by altering the idea of priority in the 
following way (at para. 62): 
... the doctrine of priority requires that the government demonstrate that, in allocating 
the resource, it has taken account of the existence of aboriginal rights and allocated the 
resource in a manner respectful of the fact that those rights have priority over the ex-
ploitation of the fishery by other users. This right is at once both procedural and sub-
stantive; at the stage of justification the government must demonstrate both that the 
process by which it allocated the resource and the actual allocation of the resource 
which results from that process reflect the prior interest of aboriginal rights holders in 
the fishery. 
After Gladstone, in the context of commercial activity, the priority of aboriginal rights 
is constitutionally satisfied if the government had talcen those rights into account and 
has allocated a resource "in a manner respectful" (at para. 62) of that priority. A court 
must be satisfied that "the government has taken into account the existence and im-
portance of [aboriginal] rights" (at para. 63) which it determines by asking the fol-
lowing questions (at para. 64): 
Questions relevant to the determination of whether the government has granted priority 
to aboriginal rights holders are ... questions such as whether the government has ac-
commodated the exercise of the aboriginal right to participate in the fishery (through 
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reduced licence fees, for example), whether the government's objectives in enacting a 
paiticular regulatory scheme reflect the need to take into account the priodty of abo-
riginal rights holders, the extent of the participation in the fishery of aboriginal rights 
holders relative to their percentage of the population, how the government has accom-
modated different aboriginal rights in a particular fishery (food versus . commercial 
rights, for example), how important the fishery is to the economic and material well-
being of the band in question, and the criteria taken into account by the government in, 
for example, allocating commercial licences amongst different users. 
(iii) Justification and Aboriginal Title 
The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow, and embellished 
by Gladstone, operate with respect to infringements of aboriginal title. In the wake of 
Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of abo-
riginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be traced to the reconcilia-
tion of the prior occupation of North America by aboriginal peoples with the asser-
tion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the recognition that "distinctive ab01iginal 
societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, poJitical and economic com-
munity" (at para. 73). In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, min-
ing, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of 
British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building 
of infrastrncture and the seltlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are 
the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can 
justify the infringement of aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure or govern-
ment act can be explained by reference to one of those objectives, however, i.s ulti-
mately a question of fact that will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis. 
The manner in which the fiduciary duty operates with respect to the second stage 
of the justification test-both with respect to the standard of scrutiny and the particular 
form that the fiduciary duty will take-will be a function of the nature of abo1iginal 
title. Three aspects of aboriginal title are relevant here. First, aboriginal title encom-
passes the right to exclusive use and occupation of land; second, aboriginal title en-
compasses the right to choose to what uses land can be put, subject to the ultimate 
limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the land to sustain future genera-
tions of aboriginal peoples; and third, that lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have 
an inescapable economic component. 
The exclusive nature of aboriginal title is relevant to the degree of scrntiny of the 
infringing measure or action. For example, if the Crown's fiduciary duty requires that 
aboriginal title be given priority, then it is the altered approach to priority that I laid 
down in Gladstone which should apply. What is required is that the government demon-
strate (at para. 62) "both that the process by which it allocated the resource and the 
actual allocation of the resource which results from that process reflect the prior in-
terest" of the holders of aboriginal title in the land. By analogy with Gladstone, this 
might entail, for example, that governments accommodate the participation of abo-
riginal peoples in the development of the resources of British Columbia, that the con-
fen-al of fee simples for agriculture, and of leases and licences for forestry and mining 
'" 
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reflect the prior occupation of aboriginal title lands, that economic barriers to abo-
riginal uses of their lands (e.g., licensing fees) be somewhat reduced. This list is 
illustrative and not exhaustive. This is an issue that may 'involve. an assessment of the 
various interests at stake in the resources in question. No doubt, there will be difficul-
ties in determining the precise value of the aboriginal interest in the land and any 
grants, leases or licences given for its exploitation. These difficult economic consid-
erations obviously cannot be solved here. 
Moreover, the other aspects of aboriginal title suggest that the fiduciary duty may 
be articulated in a manner different than the idea of priority. This point becomes clear 
from a comparison between aboriginal title and the aboriginal right to fish for food in 
Sparrow. First, aboriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a 
piece of Janel can be put. The aboriginal right to fish for food, by contrast, does not 
contain within it the same discretionary component. This aspect of aboriginal title 
suggests that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples 
may be satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal peoples in decisions taken with 
respect to their lands. There is always a duty of consultation. Whether the aboriginal 
group has been consulted is relevant to detetmining whether the infringement of abo-
riginal title is justified, in the same way that the Crown's failure to consult an aborigi-
nal group with respect to the terms by which reserve land is leased may breach its 
fiduciary duty at common law: Guerin. The nature and scope of the duty of consulta-
tion will vary with the circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less 
serious or relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important deci-
sions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to aboriginal title. Of 
course, even in these rare cases when the 1ninimum acceptable standard is consulta-
tion, this consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention of substantially 
addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most 
cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even 
require the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact 
hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands. 
Second, aboriginal title, unlike the aboriginal right to fish for food, has an ines-
capably economic aspect, particularly when one takes into account the modern uses 
to which lands held pursuant to aboriginal title can be put. The economic aspect of 
aboriginal title suggests that compensation is relevant to the question of justification 
as well, a possibility suggested in Sparrow and which I repeated in Gladstone. In-
deed, compensation for breaches of fiduciary duty are a well-established part of the 
landscape of aboriginal rights: Guerin. In keeping with the duty of honour and good 
faith on the Crown, fair compensation will ordinarily be required when aboriginal 
title is infringed. The amount of compensation payable will vary with the nature of 
the particular aboriginal title affected and with the nature and severity of the infringe-
ment and the extent to which aboriginal interests were accommodated. Since the is-
sue of dam~ges was severed from tbe principal action, we received no submissions 
on the approptfate legal principles that would be relevant to determining the appro-
priate level of compensation of infringements of aboriginal title. In the circumstances, 
it is best that we leave those difficult questions to another day. 
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It appears from the Sparrow, Gladstone,53 and Delgamuukw decisions that the fiduciary 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is very different from other 
fiduciary relationships. According to the Supreme Court, both Parliament and the provin-
cial legislatures can infringe the constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples and respect 
the Crown's fiduciary obligations to those peoples at the same time.54 On the other hand, 
Guerin and Blueberry River reveal that executive acts will be scrutinized carefully to 
ensure that the Crown's fiduciary obligations are met. 
An issue left unresolved by the Delgamuukw decision was whether the Crown owes 
fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples in situations where they claim Aboriginal title 
to land, but that title bas not yet been recognized by a court or by a treaty or land claims 
agreement.55 In particular, do provincial governments owe any duty to consult with 
Aboriginal peoples before authorizing resource development, such as logging or mining, 
on lands that are subject to unproven Aboriginal title claims? This issue was addressed in 
Haida Nation (below) and Taku River Ting/it First Nation v. British Columbia (Project 
Assessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550. In the latter case, the Supreme Court applied 
the principles set out in Haida Nation and found that the Crown in right of British 
Columbia had met its duty to consult and accommodate in relation to construction of a 
road to provide access to a mine site. 
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 
[2004] 3 SCR 51156 
[The Haida Nation claims Aboriginal title to the whole of Haida Gwaii (the Queen 
Charlotte Islands) and the smTounding waters. The existence of this title has·not yet 
been affirmed by a court decision or by a treaty or agreement with the Crown. Parts 
53 R v. Gladstone, supra note 39, applied in Delgamuukw, excerpted above. See also Gladstone v. Canada 
(Attorney General), (2005] l SCR 325, where a claim was made by two members of the Heiltsuk Nation 
to interest on the value of herring spawn that had been seiz,ed by fisheries officers in violation of the 
Heiltsuks' constitutional right to collect herring spawn on kelp. The court dismissed the claim, in part 
because it held that a fiduciary relationship did not exist in the context. 
54 For critical analysis of the provincial power of infringement, see Nigel Bankes, "Delgamuukw, Division 
of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications for Provincial Resource Rights" 
(1998), 32 University of Brilish Columbia law Review 317-5 l; Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and the 
Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998), 61 Saskatchewan law 
Review 431-65, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, supra note 8, at 249-80, and "Aboriginal Rights, Resource 
Development, and ·the Source of the Provincial Duty to Consult in Haida Nation and Talcu River" (2005), 
29 Supreme Court Law Review (2nd series) 447-60; Kerry Wilk.ins, "Of Prnvinces and Section 35 
Rights" (1999), 22 Dalhousie Law Journal 185-235, and "Negative Capacity: Of Provinces and Lands 
Reserved for the Indians" (2002), 1 Indigenous Law Journal 57-111. 
55 For discussion, see Sonia Lawrence and Patrick Macklem, "From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aborigi-
nal Rights and the Crown's Duty to Consult" (2000), 79 Canadfrm Bar Review 252-79; Thomas Isaac and 
Anthony Knox, "The Crown's Duty to Consult Aboriginal People" (2003), 41 Albe11a Law Review 49-77. 
56 For commentary on Haida Nation, see Gordon Christie, "A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: 
Sparrow, Delgamuukw, and Haida Nation" (2005), 23 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice J 7-53. 
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of the islands have nonetheless been logged, and are still being logged, pmsuant to 
provincial cutting licences, without the consent of the Haida Nation. Among these 
licences is a Tree Farm Licence (TFL), originally issued to MacMillan Bloedel Lim-
ited in 1961, and subsequently replaced and transferred 'in 1999 to Weyerhaeuser 
Company Limited. In 2000, the Haida Nation began this lawsuit, challenging the 
validity of the replacements of the licence and of its transfer to Weyerhaeuser. Among 
other things, the Haida alleged breach of fiduciary obligations by the Crown in right 
of British Columbia, arising in particular from failure by the province to consult with 
them before replacing and transferring the TFL. 
McLachlin CJ wrote the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court. She decided 
that the province does have a legally enforceable duty to consult with the Haida Na-
tion, and possibly accommodate their interests, before authorizing logging opera-
tions on Haida Gwaii, and that this duty has been breached. However, because the 
Haida Nation's Aboriginal title has not yet been established, the provincial Crown 
does not owe them fiduciary obligations in this context. Instead, the duty to consult is 
based on a broader concept of the honour of the Crown. 
After stating the facts, McLACHLIN CJ continued (at 518-20):] 
[6] This brings us to the issue before this Court The government holds legal title 
to the land. Exercising that legal title, it has granted Weyerhaeuser the right to harvest 
the forests in Block 6 of the land. But the Haida people also claim title to the land.-
title which they are in the process of trying to prove-and object to the harvesting of 
the forests on Block 6 as proposed in TFL 39. In this situation, what duty if any does 
the government owe the Haida people? More concretely, is the government required 
to consult with them about decisions to harvest the forests and to accommodate their 
concerns about what if any forest in Block 6 should be harvested before they have 
proven their title to land and their Aboriginal rights? 
(7) The stakes are huge. The Haida argue that absent consultation and accommo-
dation, they will win their title but find themselves deprived of forests that are vital to 
their economy and their culture. Forests take generations to mature, they point out, 
and old-growth forests can never be replaced. The Haida's claim to title to Haida 
Gwaii is strong, as found by the chambers judge. But it is also complex and will take 
many years to prove. In the meantime, the Haida argue, their heritage will be iITe-
trievably despoiled. 
(8) The government, in tum, argues that jt has the right and responsibility to man-
age the forest resource for the good of all British Columbians, and that until the Haida 
people formally prove their claim, they have no legal right to be consulted or have 
their needs and interests accommodated. 
[9] The chambers judge found that the government has a moral, but not a legal, duty 
to negotiate with the Haida people: [2001] 2 CNLR 83, 2000 BCSC 1280. The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that both the government 
and Weyerhaeuser have a duty to consult with and accommodate the Haida people 
with respect to harvesting timber from Block 6: (2002), 99 BCLR (3d) 209, 2002 
BCCA 147, with supplementary reasons (2002), 5 BCLR (4th) 33, 2002 BCCA 462. 
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[10] I conclude that the government has a legal duty to consult with the Haida 
people about the harvest of timber from Block 6, including decisions to transfer or 
replace Tree Farm Licences. Good faith consultation may in turn lead to an obliga-
tion to accommodate Haida concerns in the harvesting of timber, although what ac-
commodation if any may be required cannot at this time be ascertained. Consultation 
must be meaningful. There is no duty to reach agreement. The duty to consult and, if 
appropriate, accommodate cannot be discharged by delegation to Weyerhaeuser. Nor 
does Weyerhaeuser owe any independent duty to consult with or accommodate the 
Haida people's concerns, although the possibility remains that it could become liable 
for assumed obligations. It follows that I would dismiss the Crown's appeal and al-
low the appeal of Weyerhaeuser. 
[11] This case is the first of its kind to reach this Comt. Our task is the modest one 
of establishing a general framework for the duty to consult and accommodate, where 
indicated, before Aboriginal title or rights claims have been decided. As this frame-
work is applied, courts, in the age-old tradition of the common law, will be called on 
to fill in the details of the duty to consult and accommodate .... 
[After deciding that the Haida Nation's remedies were not limited to a potential inter-
locutory injunction, McLachlin CJ discussed the duty to consult and accommodate 
(at 522-26, 528-36).] 
B. The Source of a Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
[16] The government's duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommo-
date their interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown. The honour of the Crown 
is always at stake in its dealings with Aboriginal peoples: see for example R v. Badger, 
[1996] 1 SCR 771, at para. 41; R v. Marshall, [1999) 3 SCR 456. It is not a mere 
incantation, but rather a core precept that finds its application in concrete practices. 
[ 17] The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest that 
it must be understood generously in order to reflect the underlying realities from 
which it stems. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the asse1tion of sov-
ereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown 
must act honourably. Nothing less is required if we arc to achieve "the reconciliation 
of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown": 
Delgamuukw, supra, at para. 186, quoting Van der Peet, ... rR v. Van der Peet, [1996) 
2 SCR 507], at para. 31. 
[18J The honour of the Crown gives rise to different duties in different circum-
stances. Where the Crown has assumed discretionary control over specific Aboriginal 
interests, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a fiduciary duty: Wewaykum Indian 
Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 SCR 245, 2002 SCC 79, at para. 79. The content of the 
fiduciary duty may vary to talce into account the Crown's other, broader obligations. 
However, the duty's fulfilment requires that the Crown act with reference to the Aborigi-
nal group's best interest in exercising discretionary control over the specific Aboriginal 
interest at stake. As explained in Wewaykum, at para. 81, the term "fiduciary duty" 
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does not connote a universal trust relationship encompassing all aspects of the rela-
tionship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples: 
. .. "fiduciary duty" as a source of plenary Crown liability CQvenng all aspects of the 
Crown-fadian band relationship ... overshoots the mark. The fiduciary duty imposed 
on the Crown does not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian interests. 
Here, Aboriginal rights and title have been asserted but have not been defined or 
proven. The Aboriginal interest in question is insufficiently specific for the honour of 
the Crown to mandate that the Crown act in the Aboriginal group's best interest, as a 
fiduciary, in exercising discretionary control over the subject of the right or title. 
[19) The honour of the Crown also infuses the processes of treaty making and 
treaty interpretation. In making and applying treaties, the Crown must act with hon-
our and integrity, avoiding even the appearance of "sharp dealing" (Badger, at 
para. 41). Thus in Marshall, supra, at para. 4, the majority of this Court supported its 
interpretation of a treaty by stating that "nothing less would uphold the honour and 
integrity of the Crown in its dealings with the Mi'kmaq people to secure their peace 
and friendship .... " 
[20) Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires 
negotiations leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims: R v. Sparrow, [ 1990] 1 
SCR 1075, at pp. 1105-6. Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sover-
eignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed 
by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 represents a promise of rights rec-
ognition, and "[i]t is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises" 
(Badger, supra, at para. 41). This promise is realized and sovereignty claims recon-
ciled through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that the 
Crown act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them 
with other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appro-
priate, accommodate. 
[21] This duty to consult is recognized and discussed in the jurisprudence. In Spar-
row, supra, at p. 1119, this Court affirmed a duty to consult with west-coast Salish 
asserting an unresolved right to fish. Dickson CJ and La Forest J wrote that one of 
the factors in determining whether limits on the right were justified is "whether the 
aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation meas-
ures being implemented." 
[22] The Court affirmed the duty to consult regarding resources to which Abo-
riginal peoples make claim a few years later in R v. Nikal, [1996] 1SCR1013, where 
Cory J wrote: "So long as every reasonable effort is made to inform and to consult, 
such efforts would suffice to meet the justification requirement" (para. 110). 
[23) In the companion case of R v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723, Lamer CJ re-
ferred to the need for "consultation and compensation," and to consider "how the 
government i;las accommodated different aboriginal rights in a particular fishery . . . , 
how important the fishery is to the economic and material well-being of the band in 
question, and the criteria taken into account by the government in, for example, allo-
cating commercial licences amongst different users" (para. 64). 
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[24) The Court's seminal decision in Delgamuukw, supra, at para. 168, in the con-
text of a claim for title to land and resources, confirmed and expanded on the duty to 
consult, suggesting the content of the duty varied with the circumstances: from a mini-
mum "duty to discuss important decisions" where the "breach is less serious or rela-
tively minor"; through the "significantly deeper than mere consultation" that is required 
in "most cases"; to "full consent of [the] aboriginal nation" on very serious issues. 
These words apply as much to umesolved claims as to intrusions on settled claims. 
[25] Put simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, 
and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty 
of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have 
yet to do so. The potential tights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be 
determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting hon-
ourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process continues, the 
honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate 
Aboriginal interests. 
C. When the Duty to Consult and Accommodate Arises 
[26] Honourable negotiation implies a duty to consult with Aboriginal claimants 
and conclude an honourable agreement reflecting the claimants' inherent rights. But 
proving rights may take time, sometimes a very long time. In the meantime, how are 
the interests under discussion to be treated? Underlying this question is the need to 
reconcile prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of Crown sover-
eignty. Is the Crown, under the aegis of its asserted sovereignty, entitled to use the 
resources at issue as it chooses, pending proof and resolution of the Aboriginal claim? 
Or must it adjust its conduct to reflect the as yet unresolved rights claimed by the 
Aboriginal claimants? 
[27] The answer, once again, lies in the honour of tbe Crown. The Crown, acting 
honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal interests where claims 
affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotia-
tion and proof. It must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests. The Crown 
is not rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in question pending 
claims resolution. But, depending on the circumstances, discussed more fully below, 
the honour of the Crown may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate 
Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a claimed 
resource during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim to that 
resource may be to deprive the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the benefit of 
the resource. That is not honourable .... 
[32] The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to consult 
and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins 
with the assertion of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. Rec-
onciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing 
from rights guaranteed bys. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This process of recon-
ciliation flows from the Crown's duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peo-
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ples, which atises in turn from the Crown's asse1tion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal 
people and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of 
that people. As stated in Mitchell v. MNR, [2001] 1SCR91t2001SCC33, at para. 9, 
"[ w ]ith this assertion [sovereignty] arose an obligation 'to treat aboriginal peoples 
fairly and honourably, and to protect them from exploitation ... "(emphasis added). 
(33] To limit reconciliation to the post-proof sphere risks treating reconciliation 
as a distant legalistic goal, devoid of the "meaningful content" mandated by the "sol-
emn commitment" made by the Crown in recognizing and affirming Aboriginal rights 
and title: Sparrow, supra, at p. 1108. It also risks unfortunate consequences. When the 
distant goal of proof is finally reached, the Aboriginal peoples may find their land 
and resources changed and denuded. This is not reconciliation. Nor is it honourable .... 
[35] But, when precisely does a duty to consult arise? The foundation of the duty 
in the Crown's honour and the goal of reconciliation suggest that the duty arises when 
the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential existence of the Abo-
riginal right or tit.le and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it: see Half-
way River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), (1997] 4 CNLR 45 
(BCSC), at p. 71,per Dorgan J. 
[36] This leaves the practical argument. It is said that before claims are resolved, 
the Crown cannot know that the rights exist, and hence can have no duty to consult or 
accommodate. This difficulty should not be denied or minimized. As I stated (dis-
senting) in Marshall, supra, at para. 112, one cannot "meaningfully discuss accom-
modation or justification of a right unless one has some idea of the core of that right 
and its modern scope." However, it will frequently be possible to reach an idea of the 
asserted rights and of their strength sufficient to trigger an obligation to consult and 
accommodate, short of final judicial determination or settlement. To facilitate this 
determination, claimants should outline their claims with clarity, focussing on the 
scope and nature of the Aboriginal rights they assert and on the alleged infringe-
ments. This is what happened here, where the chambers judge made a preliminary 
evidence-based assessment of the strength of the Haida claims to the lands and re-
sources of Haida Gwaii, particularly Block 6. 
[37] There is a distinction between knowledge sufficient to trigger a duty to con-
sult and, if appropriate, accommodate, and the content or scope of the duty in a par-
ticular case. Knowledge of a credible but unproven claim suffices to trigger a duty to 
consult and accommodate. The content of the duty, however, varies with the circum-
stances, as discussed more fully below. A dubious or peripheral claim may attract a 
mere duty of notice, while a stronger claim may attract more stringent duties. The 
Jaw is capable of differentiating between tenuous claims, claims possessing a strong 
primafacie case, and established claims. Parties can assess these matters, and if they 
cannot agree, tribunals and courts can assist. Difficulties associated with the absence 
of proof and definition of claims are addressed by assigning appropriate content to 
the duty, not by denying the existence of a duty .... 
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D. The Scope and Con.tent of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
[39] The content of the duty to consult and acconunodate varies with the circum-
stances. Precisely what duties arise in different situations will be defined as the case 
law in this emerging area develops. In general terms, however, it may be asse1ted that 
the scope of the duty is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of 
the case supporting the existence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the 
potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed .... 
[42] At all stages, good faith on both sides is required. The common thread on the 
Crown's prut must be "the intention of substantially addressing [Abo1iginal] concerns" 
as they are raised (Delgamuukw, supra, at para. 168), through a meaningful process 
of consultation. Sharp dealing is not permitted. However, there is no duty to agree; 
rather, the commitment is to a meaningful process of consultation. As for Aboriginal 
claimants, they must not frustrate the Crown's reasonable good faith attempts, nor 
should they take unreasonable positions to th wait government from making decisions 
or acting in cases where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached: 
see Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), [1999] 4 
CNLR 1 (BCCA), at p. 44; Heiltsuk Tribal Council v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Sustainable Resource Management) (2003), 19 BCLR (4th) 107 (BCSC). Mere hard 
bargaining, however, will not offend an Aboriginal people's right to be consulted. 
(43] Against this background, I turn to the kind of duties that may arise in differ-
ent situations. In this respect, the concept of a spectrnm may be helpful, not to sug-
gest watertight legal compattments but rather to indicate what the honour of the Crown 
may require in particular circumstances. At one end of the spectrum lie cases where 
the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal right limited, or the potential for infringe-
ment minor. In such cases, the only duty on the Crown may be to give notice, disclose 
information, and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice." '[C]onsultation' 
in its least technical definition is talking together for mutual understanding": T. Isaac 
and A. Knox, "The Crown's Duty to Consult Aboriginal People" (2003), 41 Alta. 
L Rev. 49, at p. 61. 
[44] At the other end of the spectrum lie cases where a strongprimafacie case for 
the claim is established, the right and potential infringement is of high significance to 
the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk of non-compensable damage is high. In such 
cases deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution, may be re-
quired. While precise requirements will vary with the circumstances, the consultation 
required at this stage may entail the opportunity to make submissions for considera-
tion, formal participation in the decision-making process, and provision of written 
reasons to show- that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the impact 
they had on the decision. This list is neither exhaustive, nor mandatory for every case. 
The government may wish to adopt dispute resolution procedures like mediation or 
administrative regimes with impartial decision-makers in complex or difficult cases. 
[45] Between these two extremes of the spectrum just described, will lie other 
situations. Every case must be approached individually. Each must also be approached 
flexibly, since the level of consultation required may change as the process goes on 
and new information comes to light. The controlling question in all situations is what 
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. is required to maintain the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation between 
the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples with respect to the interests at stake. Pending 
settlement, the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal and Aboriginal inter-
ests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims. The Crown may be re-
quired to make decisions in the face of disagreement as to the adequacy of its response 
to Aboriginal concerns. Balance and compromise will then be necessary. 
[ 46] Meaningful consultation may oblige the Crown to make changes to its pro-
posed action based on information obtained through consultations. The New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice's Guide for Consultation with Maori (1997) provides insight (at 
pp. 21and31): 
Consultation is not just a process of exchanging information. It also entails testing and 
being prepared to amend policy proposals in the light of information received, and pro-
viding feedback. Consultation therefore becomes a process which should ensure both 
parties are better informed .. .. 
. . . genuine consultation means a process that involves ... : 
- gathering information to test policy proposals 
- putting forward proposals that are not yet finalised 
- seeking Maori opinion on those proposals 
- infonning Maori of all relevant information upon which those proposals are 
based 
- not promoting but listening with an open mind to what Maori have to say 
- being prepared to alter th~ original proposal 
- providing feedback both during the consultation process and after the decision-
process. 
[47) When the consultation process suggests amendment of Crown policy, we 
arrive at the stage of accommodation. Thus the effect of good faith consultation may 
be to reveal a duty to accommodate. Where a strong prima facie case exists for the 
claim, and the consequences of the government's proposed decision may adversely 
affect it in a significant way, addressing the Aboriginal concerns may require taking 
steps to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement, pending 
final resolution of the underlying claim. Accommodation is achieved through consul-
tation, as this Court recognized in R v. Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533, at para. 22: 
" .. . the process of accommodation of the treaty right may best be resolved by consul-
tation and negotiation." 
[48] This process does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what can be done 
with land pending final proof of the claim. The Aboriginal "consent" spoken of in 
Delgamuukw is appropriate only in cases of established rights, and then by no means in 
every case. Rather, what is required is a process of balancing interests, of give and take .... 
[After discussing accommodation and rejecting the opinion of the BC Court of Ap-
peal that Weyerhaeuser also.had a duty to consult and accommodate, McLachlin CJ 
dealt with the province's duty, at 539-40:] 
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F. The Province 's Duty 
[57] The Province of British Columbia argues that any duty to consult or accom-
modate rests solely with the federal government. I cannot accept this argument. 
[58] The Province's argument rests on s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which 
provides that "[a]ll Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several 
Provinces of Canada ... at the Unfon ... shall belong to the several Provinces." The 
Province argues that this gives it exclusive right to the land at issue. This right, it 
argues, cannot be limited by the protection for Aboriginal rights found in s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. To do so, it argues, would "undermine the balance of federal-
ism" (Crown's factum, at para. 96). 
[59] The answer to this argument is that the Provinces took their interest in land 
subject to "any Interest other than that of the Province in the same" (s. 109). The duty 
to consult and accommodate here at issue is grounded in the assertion of Crown sov-
ereignty which pre-dated the Union. It follows that the Province took the lands sub-
ject to this duty. It cannot therefore claim that s. 35 deprives it of powers it would 
otherwise have enjoyed. As stated in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The 
Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (PC), lands in the Province are "available to [the 
Province] as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the Crown is disencumbered 
of the Indian title" (p. 59). The Crown's argument on this point has been canvassed 
by this Court in Delgamuukw, supra, at para. 175, where Lamer CJ reiterated the 
conclusions in St. Catherine's Milling, supra. There is therefore no foundation to the 
Province's argument on this point. 
[After briefly discussing the standard of judicial review of government efforts to con-
sult and accommodate, McLachJjn CJ applied her analysis. She considered its appli-
cation under three headings: existence of the duty, scope of the duty, and whether the 
Crown had fulfilled its duty. Under scope of the duty, she used the criteria of the strength 
of the Aboriginal claim and the se1iousness of the potential impact on it. She noted 
the chambers judge's finding that "Haida claims to title and Aboriginal rights were 
supported by a good piima facie case." McLachlin CJ then addressed the questions of 
when on the facts the province's duty to consult arose and whether the Crown had a 
duty "to go beyond consultation." She concluded that it was impossible to know whether 
a need for accommodation arose, as the Crown had "failed to engage in any meaning-
ful consultation." The Crown therefore had breached its duty to consult. The outcome 
was that the court dismissed the Crown's appeal and allowed Weyerhaeuser's appeal.] 
The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of the Crown's duty to consult and accom-
modate in Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 
3 SCR 388. In that case, Binnie J, for a unanimous court, held that the Crown in right of 
Canada has an obligation to consult with First Nations and accommodate their treaty rights 
to hunt and trap when it takes up lands governed by a treaty for purposes that interfere 
with those rights-in this instance, the construction of a winter road. Likewise, the BC 
Court of Appeal in Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 
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[1999] 4 CNLR 1, held that the province has equivalent obligations when it takes up 
lands for a purpose (forestry, in this case) that interfere with treaty hunting rights.57 
IV. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
The law respecting the Crown's fiduciary obligations to Canada's Aboriginal peoples is 
still very much in the developmental stage. The Supreme Court decisions excerpted 
above have provided some of the doctrinal foundations for this new legal edifice, but the 
architectural design for the building itself is still sketchy. In the Wewaykum. decision 
(below), the Supreme Court attempted to provide some guidance regarding the circum-
stances in which fiduciary obligations may be present. More specifically, the court held 
that fiduciary obligations are present where there is a cognizable Aboriginal interest in 
relation to which the Crown is exercising discretionary authority. 
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada 
[2002] 4 SCR 24558 
[Wewaykum. involved a dispute between two Indian bands, the Wewaykum or 
Campbell River Band and the Wewaikai or Cape Mudge Band, over entitlement to 
two Indian reserves on Vancouver Island. Each alleged that they were entitled to the 
reserve occupied by the other. Their respective claims arose out of errors made by the 
federal Department of Indian Affairs in designating which reserve had been set aside 
for which band. While they sought relief against each other for trespass and wrongful 
possession, their real grievance was with the federal government, which they claimed 
had breached the Crown's fiduciary obligations in the context of the creation of the 
two reserves. Binnie J, delivering the unanimous decision of the court, held that the 
Crown does owe fiduciary obligations in the context of reserve creation, but decided 
that those obligations had been met in this case. 59 
After a lengthy recitation of the relevant facts, BINNIE J continued (at 281-98):] 
M. The Sui Generis Fiduciary Duty 
[72] If, as we affirm, neither band emerged from the reserve-creation process with 
both reserves, the issue arises whether this outcome establishes in the case of either 
appellant band a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the federal Crown .... 
57 For discussion, see Shin Imai, "Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The 'Tracts Taken Up' Provision" 
(2001), 27 Queen 's Law Journal l-49. 
58 For commentary on Wewaykum, see Rotman, supra note 34; Reynolds, supra note 25, esp. at 93-96, 113-
15; David E. Elliott, "Much Ado About Dittos: Wewaykum and the Fiduciary Obligation of the Crown" 
(2003), 29 Queen's Law Journal 1-40; Kent McNeil, "Culturally Modified Trees, Indian Reserves and 
the Crown's Fiduciary Obligations" (2003), 21 Supreme Court Law Review (2nd series), 105-38. 
59 For another case where the court held that the Crown's fiduciary obligations had been fulfilled in the 
context of reserve creation, see R v. Lewis, [1996] 1 SCR 921. 
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[80] This sui generis relationship [between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples] 
had its positive aspects in protecting the interests of aboriginal peoples historically 
(recall, e.g., the reference in Royal Proclamation, 1763, RSC 1985, App. II, No. 1, to 
the "great Frauds and Abuses Lthat] have been couunitted in purchasing Lands of the 
Indians"), but the degree of economic, social and proprietary control and discretion 
asserted by the Crown also left aboriginal populations vulnerable to the risks of gov-
ernment misconduct or ineptitude. The importance of such discretionary control as a 
basic ingredient in a fiduciary relationship was underscored in Professor E.J. Weinrib's 
statement, quoted in Guerin, supra, at p. 384, that: "the hallmark of a fiduciary rela-
tion is that the relative legal positions are such that one party is at the mercy of the 
other's discretion." See also: Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources 
Ltd., r1989] 2 SCR 574, per Sopinka J, at pp. 599-600; Hodgkinson v. Simms, L1994J 
3 SCR 377,per La Forest J, at p. 406; Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99,perWilson J, 
dissenting, at pp. 135-36. Somewhat associated with the ethical standards required of 
a fiduciary in the context of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is the need to uphold 
the "honour of the Crown": R v. Taylor (1981), 34 OR (2d) 360 (CA), per 
MacKinnon ACJO, at p. 367, leave to appeal refused, (1981] 2 SCR xi; Van der Peet, 
supra,per Lamer CJ, at para. 24; Marshall, supra, at paras. 49-51. 
(81] But there are limits. The appellants seemed at times to invoke the "fiduciary 
duty" as a source of plenary Crown liability covering all aspects of the Crown-Indian 
band relationship. This overshoots the mark. The fiduciary duty imposed on the Crown 
does not exist at large but in relation to specific Indian interests. In this case we are 
dealing with land, which has generally played a central role in aboriginal economies 
and cultures. Land was also the subject matter of Ross River [Ross River Dena Coun-
cil Band v. Canada, [2002] 2 SCR 816] ("the lands occupied by the Band"), Blue-
berry River and Guerin (disposition of existing reserves). Fiduciary protection ac-
corded to Crown dealings with aboriginal interests in land (including reserve creation) 
has not to date been recognized by this Court in relation to Indian interests other than 
land outside the framework of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
f82] Since Guerin, Canadian courts have experienced a flood of "fiduciary duty" 
claims by Indian bands across ::t whole spectrnm of possible complaints, for example: 
(i) to structure elections (Batchewana Indian Band (Non-resident members) v. 
Batchewana Indian Band, (1997] 1 FC 689 (CA), at para. 60; subsequently 
dealt with in this Court on other grounds); 
(ii) to require the provision of social services (Southeast Child & Family Serv-
ices v. Canada (Attorney General), [1997] 9 WWR 236 (Man. QB)); 
(iii) to rewrite negotiated provisions (BC Native Women 's Society v. Canada, 
[2000] 1 FC 304 (TD)); 
(iv) to cover moving expenses (Paul v. Kingsclear Indian Band (1997), 137 FTR 
275; Mentuck v. Canada, [1986] 3 FC 249 (TD); Deer v. Mohawk Council 
of Kahnawake, [199112FC18 (TD)); 
(v) · to suppress public access to information about band affairs (Chippewas of 
the Nawash First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Af-
fairs) (1996), 116 FTR 37, aff'd. (1999), 251 NR 220 (FCA); Montana 
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Band ofindian,s v. Canada (Minister of Indian andNorthernAffairs), [1989] 
1 FC 143 (TD); Timiskaming Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian 
and Northern Affairs) (1997), 132 FTR 106); · 
(vi) to require legal aid funding (Ominayak v: Canada (Minister of Indian Af-
fairs and Northern Development), [1987] 3 FC 174 (TD)); 
(vii) to compel registration of individuals under the Indian.Act (rejected in Tuplin 
v. Canada (Indian and Northern Affairs) (2001), 207 Nfld. & PEIR 292 
(PEISCTD)); 
(viii) to invalidate a consent signed by an Indian mother to the adoption of her 
child (rejected in G. (A.P.) v. A. (K.H.) (1994), 120 DLR (4th) 511 (Alta. QB)). 
[83] I offer no comment about the c01Tectness of the disposition of these particu-
lar cases on the facts, none of which are before us for decision, but I think it desirable 
for the Court to affinn the principle, already mentioned, that not all obligations exist-
ing between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in nature 
(Lac Minerals, supra, at p. 597), and that this principle applies to the relationship 
between the Crown and aboliginal peoples. It is necessary, then, to focus on the par-
ticular obligation or interest that is the subject matter of the particular dispute and 
whether or not the Crown had assumed discretionary control in relation thereto suffi-
cient to ground a fiduciary obligation .... 
N. Application of Fiduciary Principles to Indian Lands 
[86) For the reasons which follow, it is my view that the appellant bands' submis-
sions in these appeals with respect to the existence and breach of a fiduciary <luty 
cannot succeed: 
1. The content of the Crown's fiduciary duty towards aboriginal peoples varies 
with the nature and importance of the interest sought to be protected. It does 
not provide a general indemnity. 
2. Prior to reserve creation, the Crown exercises a public law function under the 
Indian Act-which is subject to supervision by the courts exercising public 
law remedies. At that stage a fiduciary relationship may also arise but, in that 
respect, the Crown's duty is limited to the basic obligations of loyalty, good 
faith in the discharge of its mandate, providing full disclosure appropriate to 
the subject matter, and acting with ordinary prudence with a view to the best 
interest of the aboriginal beneficiaries. 
3. Once a reserve is created, the content of the Crown's :fiduciary duty expands 
to include the protection and preservation of the band's quasi-proprietary in-
terest in the reserve from exploitation .... 
4. In this case, as the appelhmt bands have rightly been held to lack any benefi-
cial interest in the other band's reserve, equitable remedies are not available 
either to dispossess an incumbent band that is entitled to the beneficial inter-
est, or to require the Crown to pay "equitable" compensation for its refusal to 
bring about such a dispossession. 
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5. Enforcement of equitable duties by equitable remedies is subject to the usual 
equitable defences, including laches and acquiescence. 
l87 J I propose to discuss each of these propositions in turn. 
1. The content of the Crown's.fiduciary duty towards aboriginal peoples varies 
with the nature and importance of the interest sought to be protected. It does not 
provide a general indemnity. 
[881 In Ross River, supra, the Court affirmed that "[a llthough this is not at stake 
in the present appeal, it should not be forgotten that the exercise of this particular 
power I of reserve creation] remains subject to the fiduciary obligations of the Crown 
as well as to the constitutional rights and obligations which arise under s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982" (LeBel .I , at para. 62). Further, "it must not be forgotten that 
the actions of the Crown with respect to the lands occupied by the Band wiffbe gov-
erned by the fiduciary relationship which exists between the Crown and the Band. It 
would certainly be in the interests of fairness for the Crown to take into consideration 
in any future negotiations the fact that the Ross River Band has occupied these lands 
for almost half a century" (para. 77). 
[89) In the present case the reserve-creation process dragged on from about 1878 
to 1928, a period of 50 years. From at least 1907 onwards, the Department treated the 
reserves as having come into existence, which, in terms of actual occupation, they 
had. It cannot reasonably be considered that the Crown owed no fiduciary duty dur-
ing this period to bands which had not only gone into occupation of provisional re-
serves, but were also entirely dependent on the Crown to see the reserve-creation 
process through to completion. 
[90] The issue, for present purposes, is to define the content of the fiduciary duty 
"with respect to the lands occupied by the Band" (Ross River, supra, at para. 77) at 
the reserve-creation stage insofar as is necessary for the disposition of these appeals. 
f91] The situation here, unlike Guerin, does not involve the Crown interposing 
itself between an Indian band and non-Indians with respect to an existing Indian in-
terest in lands. Nor does it involve the Crown as "faithless fiduciary" failing to carry 
out a mandate confen-ed by a band with respect to disposition of a band asset. The 
federal Crown in this case was carrying out various functions imposed by statute or 
undertaken pursuant to federa l- provincial agreements. Its mandate was not the dis-
position of an existing Indian interest in the subject lands, but the creation of an 
altogether new interest in lands to which the Indians made no prior claim by way of 
treaty or aborigi~al right. 
(92) This is not to suggest that a fiduciary duty has no role to play in these cir-
cumstances. It is to say, however, that caution must be exercised. As stated, even in 
the traditional trust context not all obligations existing between the parties to a well-
recognized fiduciary relationship are themselves fiduciary in nature: Lac Minerals, 
supra, per Sopinka J, at pp. 597 et seq. Moreover, as pointed out by La Forest Jin 
Mclnerney v. MacDonald, [1992) 2 SCR 138, not all fiduciary relationships and not 
all :fiduciary obligations are the same: "[T]hese are shaped by the demands of the 
situation" (p. 149). Thus, for example, the singular demands of the administration of 
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justice drive and "shape" the content of the fiduciary relationship between solicitor 
and client: R v. Neil, [2002] 3 SCR 631, 2002 SCC 70. These observations are of 
particular importance in a case where the fiduciary is also the government, as the 
Court in Guerin fully recognized (p. 385). (In the case of rival bands asserting over-
lapping claims to s. 35 aboriginal title over the same land, for example, the Crown is 
caught truly and unavoidably in the middle, but that is not the case here.) 
[93] The starting point in this analysis, therefore, is the Indian bands' interest in 
specific lands that were subject to the reserve-creation process for their benefit, and 
in relation to which the Crown constituted itself the exclusive intermediary with the 
province. The task is to ascertain the content of the fiduciary duty in relation to those 
specific circumstances. 
2. Prior to reserve creation, the Crown exercises a public law function under 
the Indian Act, which is subject to supervision by the courts exercising public law 
remedies. At that stage a.fiduciary relationship may also arise but, in that respect, 
the Crown's duty is limited to the basic obligations of loyalty, good faith in the 
discharge of its mandate, providing full disclosure appropriate lo the subject 
matter, and acting with ordinmy prudence with a view to the best interest of the 
aboriginal beneficiaries. 
[94] Insofar as the appellant bands contend for a broad application of a fiduciary 
duty at the stage of reserve creation in non-s. 35(1) lands (as distinguished from their 
other arguments concerning existing reserves and reserve disposition), it is necessary 
to determine what the imposition of a fiduciary duty adds at that stage to the remedies 
already available at public law. The answer, I think, is twofold. In a substantive sense 
the imposition of a fiduciary duty attaches to the Crown's intervention the additional 
obligations of loyalty, good faith, full disclosure appropriate to the matter at hand and 
acting in what it reasonably and with diligence regards as the best interest of the 
beneficiary. In Blueberry River McLachlin J (as she then was), at para. 104, said that 
"[t]he duty on the Crown as fiduciary was 'that of a man of ordinary prudence in 
managing his own affairs.'" See also D.W.M. Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (2nd 
ed. 1984), at pp. 32-33; Fales v. Canada Permanent Trust Co., ("1977] 2 SCR 302, at 
p. 315. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the imposition of a fiduciary duty 
opens access to an array of equitable remedies, about which more will be said below. 
(95] In this case the intervention of the Crown was positive, in that the federal 
government sought to create reserves for the appellant bands out of provincial Crown 
lands to which these particular bands had no aborigi nal or treaty right. As explained, 
the people of the Laich-kwi1-tach First Nation arrived in the Campbell River area at 
about the same time as the early Europeans (1840-1853). Government intervention 
from 1871 onwards was designed to protect members of the appellant bands from 
displa~ement by the other newcomers. 
[96] Wheh exercising ordinary government powers in matters involving disputes 
between Indians and non-Indians, the Crown was (and is) obliged to have regard to 
the interest of all affected pm:ties, not just the Indian interest. The Crown can be no 
ordinary fiduciary; it wears many hats and represents many interests, some of which 
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cannot help but be conflicting: Samson Indian Nation and Band v. Canada, r1995] 2 
FC 762 (CA). As the Campbell River Band acknowledged in its factum, "[t]he 
Crown's position as fiduciary is necessarily unique" (para. 96). In resolving the dis-
pute between Campbell River Band members and the non-Indian settlers named 
Nunns, for example, the Crown was not solely concerned with the band interest, nor 
should it have been. The Indians were "vulnerable" to the adverse exercise of the 
government's discretion, but so too were the settlers, and each looked to the Crown 
for a fair resolution of their dispute. At that stage, prior to reserve creation, the Court 
cannot ignore the reality of the conflicting demands confronting the government, 
asserted both by the competing bands themselves and by non-Indians. As Dickson J 
said in Guerin, supra, at p. 385: 
It should be noted that fiduciary duties generally arise only with regard to obligations 
originating in a private law context. Public law duties, the performance of which requires 
the exercise of discretion, do not typically give rise to a fiduciary relationship. (Emphasis 
added.] 
[97] Here, as in Ross River, the nature and importance of the appellant bands' 
interest in these lands prior to 1938, and the Crown's intervention as the exclusive 
intermediary to deal with others (including the province) on their behalf, imposed on 
the Crown a fiduciary duty to act with respect to the interest of the aboriginal peoples 
with loyalty, good faith , full disclosure appropriate to the subject matter and with 
"ordinary" diligence in what it reasonably regarded as the best interest of the benefi-
ciaries. As the dispute evolved into conflicting demands between the appellant bands 
themselves, the Crown continued to exercise public law duties in its attempt to ascer-
tain "the places they wish to have" (as stated at para. 24), and, as a fiduciary, it was 
the Crown's duty to be even-handed towards and among the various beneficiaries. An 
assessment of the Crown's discharge of its fiduciary obligations at the reserve-creation 
stage must have regard to the context of the times. The trial judge concluded that each 
of these obligations was fulfi lled, and we have been given no persuasive reason to 
hold otherwise. 
3. Once a reserve is created, the content of the Crown'sfiduciary duty expands 
to include the protection and preservation of the band's quasi-proprietary interest 
in the reserve from exploitation. 
[98] The content of the fiduciary duty changes somewhat after reserve creation, 
at which time the band has acquired a "legal interest" in its reserve, even if the reserve 
is created on ·non-s. 35(1) lands. In Guerin, Dickson J said the fiduciary "interest 
gives rise upon surrender to a distinctive fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown" 
(p. 382). These dicta should not be read too narrowly. Dickson J spoke of surrender 
because those were the facts of the Guerin case. As this Court recently held, expro-
priation of an existing reserve equally gives rise to a fiduciary duty: Osoyoos Indian 
Band v. Oliver (Town), (2001) 3 SCR 746, 2001 SCC 85. See also Kruger v. The 
Queen, [1986] 1FC3 (CA). 
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[99) At the time of reserve disposition the content of the fiduciary duty may change 
(e.g. to include the implementation of the wishes of the band members). In Blueberry 
River, McLachlin J observed at para. 35: 
It follows that under the Indian Act, the Band had the right to decide whether to surren-
der the reserve, and its decision was to be respccced. At the same time, if the Band's 
decision was foolish or improvident- a decision that constituted exploitation-the 
Crown could refuse to consent. In short, the Crown's obligation was limited to prevent-
ing exploitative bargains. 
To the same effect see R v. Lewis, [1996) 1 SCR 921, per Iacobucci J, at para. 52, 
and, in another context, Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 SCR 85, per 
La Forest J, at pp. 129-30. 
[100] It is in the sense of "exploitative bargain," I think, that the approach of 
Wilson Jin Guerin should be understood. Speaking for herself, Ritchie and Mcintyre 
JJ, Wilson J stated that pxior to any disposition the Crown has "a fiduciary obligation 
to protect and preserve the Bands' interests from invasion or destruction" (p. 350). 
The "interests" to be protected from invasion or destruction, it should be emphasized, 
are legal interests, and the threat to their existence, as in Guerin itself, is the exploita-
tive bargain (e.g. the lease with the Shaughnessy Heights Golf Club that in Guerin 
was found to be "unconscionable"). This is consistent with Blueberry River and Lewis. 
Wilson J's comments should be taken to mean that ordinary illligence must be used 
by the Crown to avoid invasion or destruction of the band's quasi-property interest by 
an exploitative bargain with third parties or, indeed, exploitation by the Crown itself. 
(Of course, there will also be cases dealing with the ordinary accountability by the 
Crown, as fiduciary, for its administrative control over the reserve and band assets.) 
[101] The Cape Mudge appellants contend that the Crown breached its fiduciary 
duty with respect to its two reserves (while attacking the trial judge's rejection of this 
factual premise) by permitting (or even encouraging) the 1907 Resolution. They have 
been deprived of their legal interest in Reserve No .11, they say, by an "exploitative 
bargain." They gave away 350 acres for nothing. 
[102] While the reserves were not constituted, as a matter of law, until 1938, I 
would be prepared to assume that, for purposes of this argument, the fiduciary duty 
was in effect in 1907. The Cape Mudge Band argument is nevertheless unconvincing. 
I do not accept what, with respect, is its shaky factual premise, i.e., that the band 
"gave away" Reserve No. 11 as opposed to entering a quit claim in favour of a sister 
band with a superior interest. More importantly, this argument rests on a misconcep-
tion of the Crown's fiduciary duty. The Cape Mudge forbears, whose conduct is now 
complained of, were autonomous actors, apparently fully informed, who intended in 
good faith to resolve a "difference of opinion" with a sister band. They were not 
dealing with non-Indian third parties (Guerin, at p. 382). It is patronizing to suggest, 
on the basis. of the evidentiary record, that they did not know what they were doing, 
or to reject their evaluation of a fair outcome. Taken in context, and looking at the 
substance rather than the form of what was intended, the 1907 Resolution was not in 
the least exploitative. 
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[103] While courts applying principles of equity rightly insist on flexibility to 
deal with the unforeseeable and infinite variety of circumstances and interests that 
may arise, and which will fall to be decided under equitable rules, it must be said that 
the bold attempt of the appellant bands to extend their claim to fiduciary relief on the 
present facts is overly ambitious. 
[104] On the other hand, the trial judge and the Federal Court of Appeal adopted, 
with respect, too restricted a view of the content of the fiduciary duty owed by the 
Crown to the Indian bands with respect to their existing quasi-proprietary interest in 
their respective reserves. In their view, the Crown discharged .its fiduciary duty with 
respect to existing reserves by balancing "the interests of both the Cape Mudge Indians 
and the Campbell River Indians and to resolve their conflict regarding the use and 
occupation of the [Laich-kwil-tach] reserves ... [without favouring] the interests of 
one band over the interest of the other" (para. 493 FTR and para.121 NR). With 
respect, the role of honest referee does not exhaust the Crown's fiduciary obligation 
here. The Crown could not, merely by invoking competing interests, shirk its fiduci-
ary duty. The Crown was obliged to preserve and protect each band's legal interest in 
the reserve which, on a true interpretation of events, had been allocated to it. In my 
view it did so. 
[Binnie J went on to hold (at the heading after para. 104) that, "as the appellant bands 
have rightly been held to lack any beneficial interest in the other band's reserve, equi-
table remedies are not available either to dispossess an incumbent band that is entitled 
to the beneficial interest, or to require the Crown to pay 'equitable' compensation for 
its refusal to bring about such a dispossession" (emphasis removed). He also decided 
that the bands' claims were barred anyway by ]aches, acquiescence, and statutory 
limitation periods.] 
Read together, Wewaykum and Haida Nation appear to be attempts by the Supreme Couit 
to put some lintits on the range of fiduciary obligation claims against the Crown, but at 
the same time to place on the federal and provincial governments obligations of consulta-
tion and accommodation in situations where a cognizable Aboriginal interest has been 
claimed but not yet established. The court's evident concern is to ensure that Aboriginal 
peoples are treated fairly, thereby upholding the honour of the Crown. 
The courts have been dealing with the application of fiduciary law to the Aboriginal-
Crown relationship in other contexts as weil.60 In the following recent Federal Court 
decision, Teitelba1:1m J held that, while the Crown in right of Canada is a trustee of money 
received by it from oil and gas revenues on Indian reserve lands, its duty to invest this 
money is governed by statute and is satisfied by the payment of interest. See also Samson 
Indian Nation and Band v. Canada, [2006] 1 CNLR 100 (FCTD). 
60 For a very useful, recent survey of the case law, see Reynolds, supra note 25, at 83-125. 
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Ermineskin Indian Band and Nations v. Canada 
(2005), 269 FTR 188 
[Regarding the Crown's fiduciary obligations, TEITELBAUM J wrote:] 
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[271] Jn the case at bar, the Crown holds the Indian moneys, pursuant to section 
61(1) of the Indian Act, for the "use and benefit" of Indians or bands; the funds may 
only be expended for their "benefit." At the very least, this gives rise to a fiduciary 
obligation. However, in my opinion, insofar as Indian moneys are concerned, a trust 
corpus, or res, exists. The Indian moneys derive from the disposition of an interest in 
land, in the case at bar, through the 1946 Surrender. In Guerin, upon the surrender of 
the land, the band's right in the land disappeared; nothing more remained that could 
constitute the trust corpus. In the instant case, however, the disposition of the plain-
tiffs' interest in the land leads to the royalty moneys, which form the trust corpus. 
[272J As for the source of this trust, I do not agree with the plaintiffs' assertion 
that the trust arises from either the historical relationship between the Crown and 
aboriginal people, or Treaty 6 Ll876] .... 
(274] In my opinion, both the reserve clause in Treaty 6 and Morris's remarks can-
not be relied on as the source of the ttust. At the time Treaty 6 was signed, the Indian 
moneys that are the subject matter of this action did not exist. They came into being 
subsequent to the execution of the 1946 Surrender of Minerals document. The words 
contained in that document are sufficient to create a trust: there are certainties of intent, 
subject-matter, and object. The agreement explicitly contemplates a trust; the subject-
matter is the royalty moneys; and the object, or beneficiary, i:; clearly the plaintiffs. 
[275] Having discussed the Crown as a trustee for Indian moneys, I will now 
examine the nature of its obligations as such. 
[276] Many of the duties owed by a trustee are similar to those of a fiduciary. The 
trustee may not realize a profit from its custody of the trust property, or misuse it in 
any way. The trustee owes a duty of loyalty and good faith to the beneficiary. The 
trustee also owes a duty to be evenhanded as between different beneficiaries. How-
ever, unlike a fiduciary, a trustee owes a positive duty to invest the corpus-or, put 
another way, make it productive-when the corpus is a wasting asset, such as money. 
The trust corpus may not lie fallow. This is the duty to invest. 
[277 J The standard of care applicable to a trustee carrying out the administration 
of a trust was set out by Dickson J in Fales et al. v. Canada Permanent Trust Com-
pany, [1977] 2 SCR 302 atp. 315: 
Traditionally, the standard of care and diligence required of a trustee in administering a 
trust is that of a man of ordinary prudence in managing his own affairs (Learoyd v. 
Whiteley [(1887), 12 App. Cas. 727], at p. 733; Underhill's Law o/Trusts and Trustees, 
12th ed., art. 49; Restaternent of the Law on Trusts, 2nd ed., para. 174) and traditionally 
the standara has been applied equally to professional and non-professional trustees. 
The standard has been of general application and objective though, at times, rigorous. 
[278] Thus, the standard of care, in terms of the duty to invest, is that of reason-
able care and skill of an ordinary prudent person. 
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[279] The plaintiffs contend that the Crown did not fulfill its duty to invest and 
that the Crown should have either made actual investments in the market with their 
funds, or tied the interest rate to benchmarks or market indices. The plaintiffs assert 
that section 61(2) of the Indian Act does not require that Indian moneys be held in the 
CRF [Consolidated Revenue Fund]. Ermineskin submits that the purpose of section 
61(2) is to ensure that, if the Crown does hold Indian moneys in the CRF, then the 
Crown must pay interest at an appropriate rate, consistent with its duties as trustee or 
fiduciary regarding those moneys. 
[280] I cannot agree with Ermineskin's submission regarding section 61(2) of the 
Indian Act. I am satisfied that the legislation info1ms the Crown's duties as trustee for 
Indian moneys. There is no doubt that the royalty moneys are to be held in trust. That 
language appears in the 1946 SmTender and later in section 4 of the Indian Oil and 
Gas Act. Although that piece of legislation was enacted in 1974 and royalties had 
been collected by the Crown long before that date, the Indian Oil and Gas Act found 
its genesis in the world oil crisis of 1973. Section 4 and the words "in trust" confirm 
what was an already existing situatioq and in no way altered the manner in which the 
funds were to be held and administered. 
[281] While section 4 of the Indian Oil and Gas Act confirms the trust, the charac-
terization of Indian moneys as public money within the meaning of section 2 of the 
Financial Administration Act means that they must be deposited into the CRF, pursu-
ant to section 17. Section 61 (2) of the Indian Act mandates that they be paid interest 
at a rate to be determined by the Governor in Council. There is no choice in whether 
or not to pay interest: the Crown must do so. However, the Crown also has discretion 
in fixing the rate. 
[282] No legal authority exists that would permit the Minister to purchase invest-
ments with Indian moneys, instead of paying a rate of interest. Recall that when the 
Indian Act was amended in 1951, the power to make investments, under section 92, 
was specifically removed. 
[283] In paying arate of interest to the Indian moneys pursuant to section 61(2) of 
the lndian Act, I am satisfied that the Minister has discharged his duty as a trustee to 
invest the trust corpus. In fixing a rate of interest-or investing-the tmstee's duty is 
not to maximize profits. If that was the case, then any trustee failing to earn the maxi-
mum possible on property entrusted to her, would be liable for breach of trust. Rather, 
the standard that applies to the duty to invest is that of reasonableness. The trustee 
must, of course, act prudently. In the case of the Indian moneys, the rate of interest is 
tied to long-term Government of Canada bonds. The money is not committed to re-
main in the C~F for any specified period of time and may be withdrawn, subject to 
the parameters established by section 64 of the Indian Act. I am satisfied that the rate 
of interest meets the reasonableness standard for assessing a trustee's conduct. 
[284] The plaintiffs also contend that the Crown is in breach of its duty as a trus-
tee not to commingle their money with its own by depositing the Indian moneys into 
the CRF. I have already found that the Crown may rely on the legislation in carrying 
out its duties as a trustee. The legislation requires that Indian moneys be deposited 
into the CRF. While in a sense they are commingled, the Crown keeps accounts for 
the Indian moneys. As I noted earlier in these Reasons, the Crown reports on the 
r 
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royalty moneys by reference to "Indian Band Funds-Capital Accounts." The Crown 
reports on the interest it pays on the capital and revenue accounts by reference to 
"Indian Band Funds-Revenue Accounts" (E-796 and E-797, para. 50). The duly to 
keep trust property separate exists so as to protect the property- perhaps from em-
bezzlement or misappropriation-and prevent it from losing its identity. In the in-
stant case, the trustee is the Crown and the Crown cannot be said to be akin to an 
ordinary trustee in every possible way. The plaintiffs' moneys are deposited into the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund; however, they are reported on and accounted for sepa-
rately. There is no danger that the moneys are unaccessible or that the Crown will be 
unable to pay them out. Accordingly, I find there is no breach by lhe Crown of its 
duties by depositing the Indian moneys into the CRF. 
[285] Since I have found that the Crown may-and indeed must-rely on the 
legislation, as it informs and defines the Crown's duty as trustee, I need not review or 
comment on the wealth of expert evidence presented to me on the industry standards, 
norms, and practices of commercial trustees. 
The Federal Cou1t of Appeal upheld this aspect of Teitelbaum J's decision in Ermineskin 
Indian Band and Nations v. Canada; Samson Indian Nation and Band v. Canada, (2007] 2 
CNLR 51. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted on August 30, 2007. 
Another important context in which fiduciary obligations are being raised is in rela-
tion to residential schools. While attempts are being made to avoid litigation in resolving 
many of the more than 10,000 claims that have been made against the federal government 
and the churches that ran che schools, other cases have gone to court. In the following 
case, the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that both the federal govern-
ment and the United Church of Canada are vicariously liable (75 percent and 25 percent, 
respectively) for repeated sexual assaults conunitted against Aboriginal children by an 
employee in a residential schooI.61 
Blackwater v. Plint 
[2005] 3 SCR 3 
[After dealing with the matter of vicarious liabiUty and other issues, McLACHLIN CJ, 
delivering the ~nanimous decision of the court, briefly addressed the fiduciary obli-
gations claim:] 
[56] Neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeal found breach of fiduciary 
duty. The appellant, Mr. Barney, asks that we reverse this decision. 
61 Compare E.B. v. Order of the Oblates of Ma1y Immaculate in the Province of British Columbia, [2005] 3 
SCR 45. See also Bonaparte v. Canada (Attorney General), 12003] 2 CNLR 43 (Ont. CA); R.J.G. v. 
Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SKCA 102, applying A. (C.) ''·Critchley, [2003} 2 SCR 403. 
974 Chapter 16 Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples 
[57] A fiduciary duty is a trust-like duty, involving duties of loyalty and an obli-
gation to act in a disinterested manner that puts the recipient's interest ahead of all 
other interests: KL.B. v. British Columbia, [2003] 2 SCR 403, 2003 SCC 51, para. 49. 
[58] The argument for breach of fiduciary duty is presented on two different bases: 
one individual, one collective. 
[59] The first argument, put on an individual basis, is that the government of Can-
ada and the Church occupied a trust-}jke relationship with attendant trust-like duties 
with respect to Mr. Barney and other students at the school. As such, it was required 
to put their interests first and avoid disloyalty in its conduct toward them. 
[60] Assumfog such a duty did exist, the trial judge found that it was not breached 
in this case. He specifically found that neither the Church nor Canada were dishonest or 
intentionally disloyal. These findings of fact have not been negated. It follows that breach 
of fiduciary duty toward Mr. Barney and his schoolmates has not been established. 
[ 61] Beneath this specific argument, a second broader argument focussing on Abor-
iginal children collectively can be discerned. This is the argument that the system of 
residential schools robbed Indian children of their communities, culture and support 
and placed them in environments of abuse. This, it is argued, amounted to dishonest 
and disloyal conduct that violated the government's fiduciary duty to Canada's Abor-
iginal peoples. 
[62] This argument cannot be resolved on this appeal. It was not raised below, 
other than as contextual background to the circumstances and events at the school 
Mr. Barney attended, AIRS. It was pursued only at this level, and then mainly by 
interveners. In support of their argument, they submitted studies and writings, none 
of which were proved in evidence in the courts below and the historic and scientific 
validity of which the respondents have had no opportunity to challenge. In these cir-
cumstances, it would be unfair to rely on this material and inappropriate to deal with 
the larger argument. 
[63] We agree with the courts below that the argument on fiduciary duty pre-
sented in this case cannot succeed. 
While the court dismissed the fiduciary obligation claims in Blackwater, the decision did 
not rule out such claims in the future. It seems that both individual and collective claims 
are still possible, if supported by facts and legal arguments presented at trial. 
An issue Canadian courts have yet to address involves the connection between the 
Crown's fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples and a possible Aboriginal right 
of self-governmeµt.62 Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet held that the 
Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right of self-government, in R v. Pamajewon, (1996] 
62 The following decisions have, however, considered the scope of the Crown's fiduciary obligations in the 
context of band council elections and referendums: Blackfoot Indian Band v. Canada (1986), 7 FfC 133; 
Six Nations Traditional Hereditary Chiefs v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), (1992] 3 
CNLR 156 (FCTD). 
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2 SCR 821, the court assumed, without deciding, that such a right exists.63 Moreover, in 
Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 4 CNLR 1, Williamson J of the BC Supreme Court 
decided that the Nisga' a Nation has such a right, now exercisable in accordance with the 
Nisga'a Treaty (1998). Assuming that Aboriginal peoples generally have this right,64 are 
the Crown's fiduciary obligations and Aboriginal self-government compatible?65 
This question was examined by William R. McMurtry and Alan Pratt in a perceptive 
article entitled "Indians and the Fiduciary Concept, Self-Government and the Constitu-
tion: Guerin in Perspective."66 The authors pointed out that Guerin actually supports the 
independent decision-making authority of the Aboriginal peoples, because both Dickson 
and Wilson JJ held that the Crown had breached its fiduciary duty by not going back to 
lhe Musqueam Band for further instructions when the Crown was unable to obtain the 
leasehold terms that the Musqueams desired. Since then, Blueberry River has fortified 
this perception that the Crown's fiduciary obligations support rather than undermine self-
government. The passages from McLachlin and Gonthier JJ's judgments, excerpted above, 
reveal that the Crown had a duty to respect the decisions of the Beaver Band unless, in 
McLachlin J's words, "the Band's decision was foolish or improvident-a decision that 
constituted exploitation ."67 
Guerin and Blueberry River both involved decision making by Indian bands under the 
statutory authority of the Indian Act, now RSC 1985, c. 1-5. However, recent jurispru-
dence on s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 reveals that Aboriginal groups holding 
communal Aboriginal rights at common law also have decision-making authority with 
respect to those rights, whether those groups are Indian Act bands or not. For example, in 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, above, at 1082-83, Lamer CJ said that decisions re-
specting the use of Aboriginal title lan<l an~ madt: by the community holding the title. 
63 In Pamajewon, the court nonetheless held that the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations had failed to 
establish that they had an Aboriginal right of self-government in relation to high-stakes gambling on 
their reserves. 
64 See also Mitchell v. MNR, [2001) 1 SCR 911, per Binnie J. For arguments in favour of an inherent right 
of self-government, see Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right 
of Self-Government in Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990); Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners i11 Confederatio11: Aborigi11al Peoples, Self-Government, 
and the Co11stitwion (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993); Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal 
Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" (1998), 5 Tulsa Journal of Comparative 
and lntematio11al Law 253-98, reprinted in Emerging Justice?, supra note 8, at 59-101. 
65 See, for example, Lacourciere J's statement in R v. Vincent, [1993) 2 CNLR 165 (Ont. CA), at 177: "We 
agree with the respondent that the fiduciary role of the Crown is incompatible with the free and 
independent allies status claimed by the Indian tribes." 
66 [1986) 3 Canadia11 Native Law Reporter 19-46. See also Brian Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitu-
tion: A Question of Trust" (1992), 71 Canadian Bar Review 261-93; Alan Pratt, "Aboriginal Self-Govern-
ment and tbe Crown's Fiduciary Duty: Squaring the Circle or Completing the Circle?" (1993), 2 National 
Joumal of Constitutional Law 163-95; Michael Coyle, "Loyalty and Distinctiveness: A New Approach to 
the Crown's Fiduciary Duty Toward Aboriginal Peoples" (2003), 40 Alberta Law Review 841-66. 
67 Bluebeny River, supra note 33, at 371. See also Opetchesaht /11dia11 Band v. Canada, [1997] 2 SCR 119. 
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Moreover, if the federal or provincial governments want to infringe Aboriginal title, they 
must respect the Crown's fiduciary obligations by consulting with the community that 
holds it. In Delgamuukw, at 1113, Lamer CJ linked the community's decision-making 
authority with the duty to consult in the following passage which is worth requoting: 
(A]boriginal title encompasses within it a right to choose to what ends a piece of land can be 
put. ... This aspect of aboriginal title suggests that the fiduciary relationship between the 
Crown and aboriginal peoples may be satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal peoples in 
decisions taken with respect to their lands. There is always a duty of consultation. Whether 
the aboriginal group has been consulted is relevant to determining whether the infringement 
of aboriginal title is justified, in the same way that the Crown's failure to consult an 
aboriginal group with respect to the terms by which reserve land is leased may be a breach 
of its fiduciary duty at common law: Guerin. 
The Supreme Court therefore appears to be supportive of the authority of Aboriginal 
peoples to make their own decisions where their communal rights are concerned.68 This 
authority can definitely be viewed as an aspect of self-government.69 Moreover, in 
Guerin and Blueberry River the Supreme Court used the fiduciary relationship to uphold 
this decision-making authority. It therefore seems that the fiduciary relationship and the 
right of self-government are not incompatible-instead, the former can be used to sup-
port the latter in appropriate circumstances. This is an area in which one can expect 
further development in both law and policy as negotiations between Aboriginal peoples 
and the Canadian, provincial, and territorial governments progress and the inherent right 
of self-government is implemented. 
68 See also R v. Marshall (No. 2), [1999] 3 SCR 533, at 547, where the court held that communal treaty 
rights "are exercised by the authority of the local community" to which an individual belongs. 
69 See Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000) 4 CNLR 1. For further discussion, see McNeil, supra note 64, 
at 278-91 (Emerging Justice?, at 82-95). 
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